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
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
OTHER ACTION:

THE REDUCTION OF PANTELLERIA AND ADJACENT ISLANDS

8 MAY - 14 JUNE 1943

AIR HISTORICAL OFFICE

Headquarters, Army Air Force.



ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES: NO. 52

THE REDUCTION OF PANTELLERIA AND ADJACENT ISLANDS

8 May - 14 June 1943

Air Historical Office Headquarters, Army Air Forces May 1947

FOREWORD

This monograph, prepared by Dr. Edith C. Rodgers, deals with various aspects of the Pantellerian operation—the reasons for undertaking the project, the planning that preceded the attack, the actual bombardment of the island, its capitulation on 11 June 1943, and an estimate of the operation as an experiment in the ability of air power to bring about the surrender of a strongly fortified position. The narrative also describes the brief action that resulted in the capture of Lampedusa on 12 June 1943, and the taking of the neighboring islands of Linosa and Lampione within the next two days.

This study, like others in the series, is subject to revision as additional materials become available.

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The Reduction of Pantelleria and Adjacent Islands

8 May - 14 June 1943

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1943, the future trend of the war in the Mediterranean theater was indicated in the aerial bombardment of Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy. From the frequency and weight of these attacks there was reason to believe that, upon conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, the Allies intended either to move northward across the Mediterranean or to direct an intensive air offensive against Italy and the more important of her insular possessions, in the hope of hastening the capitulation of this member of the Axis. As a matter of fact, it was the former course that was to be pursued, for, as a result of strategic decisions made at the Casablanca Conference in January of that year, the invasion of Sicily had been scheduled for the favorable period of the July moon. By the end of April, plans for the capture of the island already had reached an advanced stage. the project took final form, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, became increasingly impressed with the desirability of occupying Pantelleria and Lampedusa as a preliminary to such an undertaking. 2

Strategically located in the narrows between North Africa and Sicily, these Italian outposts virtually command the passage connecting the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean, and serve as stepping stones to the Italian mainland. Pantelleria, the larger and more valuable of the two, lies 53 air miles southeast of Cap Bon

^{*}Not in an absolute sense, but as a practical compromise between demands of the Navy for derkness and of the airborne forces for light.

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on the tip of Tunisia and 63 air miles southwest of Capo Granitola, Sicily, while Lampedusa is about 100 miles distant from Cap Afrique on the Tunisian coast and approximately 135 miles from Sicily. On account of their geographical position these islands inevitably would play a part in the coming operation. In the hands of the Allies they would be a distinct asset; but if left in possession of the enemy, they would constitute a grave menace. Both were the seats of Freya radio direction finder (RDF) stations of sufficient power to detect the movement of aircraft not only over adjacent waters of the central Mediterranean but over the plains of eastern Tunisia as well. 4 Both had observation posts which took note of practically every ship that passed between them and the shores of North Africa. It was recognized that, during the period preparatory to the assault upon Sicily, entire concealment of plans would be precluded by the magnitude of the scale upon which the operation was being mounted. As a consequence, the element of strategic surprise would be lost ipso facto -- a state of affairs that made the greatest possible use of tactical surprise of double importance. Under existing conditions such advantage also was out of the question, because the assembling of at least a portion of the invasion fleet would be subjected to the scrutiny of the enemy. On D-day, announcement of the impending attack, in all likelihood, would be flashed to Sicily and the Italian mainland soon after the aircraft of the airborne divisions had left their North African bases, and parts of the vast naval armada had sailed from ports in the same area for the rendezvous off Malta.

Moreover, enemy aircraft based on Pantelleria obviously would

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constitute a serious threat to Allied bombers in their assault upon Sicily. Since it was estimated that the airfield there could accommodate as many as 30 or more single-engine planes, neutralization of these fighters would necessitate the diversion of a considerable number of Allied aircraft at a time when they could ill be spared. The capture of Fantelleria, on the other hand, would provide a partial solution to the perplexing problem of furnishing fighter protection for shipping and for ground troops during the initial stages of the coming invasion—especially for those forces landing on the beaches between Scoglitti and Licata. For this purpose the North African airfields were out of effective range, and those on the British islands of Malta and Gozo were inadequate for basing all the short-range fighters required. The stationing of a few squadrons on Pantelleria therefore would do much to improve the situation.


In addition, there were advantages of a more general character. Between Pantelleria and the lesser islands of Lampedusa and Linosa on the south lay an expanse of sea that had proved extremely dangerous for Allied ships. Pantelleria, especially, had contributed to the perils of these waters, in that various caves and grottoes along its shores had been converted into shelters and refueling points for patrol (MAS) boats and submarines, and its airfield was used by enemy bombers that preyed upon shipping. As a consequence, possession of these channel islands would greatly facilitate the passage of convoys through the Mediterranean. The two outposts also would provide much-needed pin-points for navigation. They would furnish convenient sites for weather and radio stations and would serve as bases for launches engaged in

the work of air-sea rescue.

Against the tactical value of the islands, however, needed to be weighed the risks which their capture might entail. These hazards were by no means slight, for a protracted operation involving heavy losses in men, ships, and landing craft might weaken or even postpone the attack upon Sicily. To jeopardize the success of the larger undertaking in the attainment of a minor objective would be shortsighted indeed. In fact, failure to take the islands promptly might be attended by serious consequences. Regardless of any attempt on the part of the Allies to represent the attack upon Pantelleria and Lampedusa as a continuation of their efforts to open the central Mediterranean to shipping, the assault would indicate the direction in which their North African forces intended to move. Unless such a step were offset by compensatory gain, this disclosure would be a distinct disadvantage. Finally, it was necessary to recognize the fact that a successful defense of the islands would stiffen the spirit of the Italian Army at the very time when the Allies were trying to break its morale. Despite these considerations, it was thought that, with careful planning, the CORKSCREW operation could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion within the period allotted to the campaign.

Roughly elliptical in shape, with its longer axis trending northwest—southeast, Pantelleria is an outcrop of volcanic rock measuring approximately eight and three-tenths miles long and more than five miles wide.

With an area of 42.5 square miles, its size is therefore a little less



than half that of Malta. Its coastline tends to be irregular and lacks sandy beaches; but in several localities, such as the bays of Levante and San Gaetano, rock ledges varying from a few hundred feet to a halfmile in length make it possible to gain a foothold on the island. For an invasion, however, the only feasible landing area -- and that none too good -- is to be found in the vicinity of the town of Porto di Pantelleria, which stands at the northwest end of the island, adjacent to a small harbor of the same name. Although landing stages or wharves serving as points of refuge are located at Porto di Scauri and several other places, this port possesses the only developed harbor. Consisting originally of an indentation between two tongue-like lava flows, this anchorage had been converted into an inner and an outer basin by the building of two breakwaters and a mole. Both harbors are small and too shallow to accommodate any but light-draught vessels such as coasters and LST's. In fact, the outer one is little more than a roadstead with sheltered berths for several small ships and other lesser craft. Outside this area, however, lies an expanse of greater depth where larger ships can anchor in about 26 feet of water. Shallowness, coupled with high surf and off-shore currents that follow the winds around the coast of the island, occasionally make entrance into the harbor itself difficult and even dangerous.9

Except on the north and west, where the rocks are low or the land slants directly into the sea, Pantelleria is girt by cliffs worn by wave action and ranging in height to some hundreds of feet. Seen from the sea, it presents a formidable appearance, which is increased by the

C. William

prevailingly somber color of the rocks -- a circumstance that accounts for its being referred to as "L'Isola Nera," or Black Island. 10 To this impression of formidableness the topography of the island also contributes. Broken by lava flows and volcanic cones, the terrain rises from the coast toward the center of the island where Montagna Grande, the highest peak, reaches an elevation of 2,743 feet. No streams exist on the island, but ravines and eroded channels carry off such rainfall as is not absorbed by the porous soil or caught in basins. Since the surface-covering consists largely of lava, pumice, and volcanic ash, the vegetation is low and sparse, and of a dusty olive green. Some of the heights are dotted with evergreens, and, on the hillsides and in the sloping valleys where suitable top soil is found, grapes, figs, olives, capers, lentils, and other fruits and vegetables are grown. The high, thick walls of native stone which divide the arable land into fields and give crops some protection from the wind, form a conspicuous feature of the landscape and produce the effect of terracing. 11

Pantelleria, known in ancient times as Cossyra, has had a long and varied history. Occupied in turn by Carthaginians, Romans, Moors, and Mormans, it finally became attached to Sicily politically and, in 1860, passed with it under the domination of the Kingdom of Italy. Almost forgotten for years, the tiny island did not attract attention again until the middle 1920's, when Premier Benito Mussolini established a penal colony there and began the building of fortifications. Some improvements also were undertaken. For convenience, a light, narrowgauge railway was built from a quarry near Cala dell'Alca to the outermost mole of the port, with a spur leading to a water distillation plant

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not far away. Provision for better means of communication than that afforded by the mule tracks and narrow, rock-fenced lanes of the island was made by converting an existing trail into a hard-surfaced road that follows the coast and branches off to various military installations. With the announcement that naval and air bases were under construction, the Italian Government in 1937 forbade flights over the island and waters adjacent to it. Thereafter landings, too, were barred. When these steps were taken, it is probable that Mussolini was not thinking in terms of defense. By fortifying Pantelleria he sought rather to consolidate his hold upon the central Mediterranean and to neutralize the powerful French base at Bizerte (120 miles to the northwest) and the British stronghold of Malta (140-odd miles to the south
12 east).

Although there was some reason to doubt the claim that Pantelleria was an Italian Gibraltar or a Malta, such intelligence as was available seemed to indicate that Italian engineering skill had done much to develop the natural defenses of this outpost. At the northern end of the island, not far from the town of Pantelleria, a flat tract of land suitable for an airdrome had been obtained by the leveling of two volcanic cones east of Monte Sant' Elmo. Here possibly as many as 100 planes had been based during the Tunisian campaign, but, with the passage of the North African coast into Allied hands, its value had, of course, been greatly diminished. The airfield itself, a rough parallelogram (with its longer axis measuring about 5,100 feet and its shorter diagonal about 3,100 feet), was flanked by what was thought to

be an underground hangar, penetrable only by bombs ricocheted off the landing ground. On account of the reputed magnitude of the structure, there was reason to suppose that within it were workshops, repair and maintenance facilities, and space sufficient for the housing of a considerable number of planes.

Along the rugged coast photographic reconnaissance had revealed the disposition of more than 100 gun emplacements. Many of these were hewn from rock; others, of concrete, were nidden by a covering of lava blocks. The greatest number found in the vicinity of the harbor, but the remainder were so located as to concentrate heavy fire upon the few additional places in which landings could be made. To supplement these defenses there were, scattered among the mountains, strong-points and pillboxes embedded in the sides of cliffs—a type of position that made them virtually impervious to air bombardment.

Because of the possibility that the garrison had been reinforced in the course of the North African campaign, it was difficult to arrive at a figure representative of its strength. Estimates by Intelligence placed the number of men at approximately 10,000—a contingent that seemed more than adequate for the defense of an island no larger than Pantelleria. In fact, there was reason to believe that, if its fortifications were skillfully manned by well-disciplined and vigilant troops, the island might prove a formidable position. Under the leadership of determined men every house could be converted into an arsenal; every pile of rubble could become a menace; and all the rock walls that criss-crossed the hills and lined the narrow roads of the interior could be

2

used as a system of defenses against an invading army, especially one employing large numbers of wheeled vehicles. Of the quality of the defenders' morale there was, however, little direct evidence, for a small raiding party recently organized to procure prisoners for interrogation had been prevented by weather conditions from effecting a landing. Even the poor showing made by antiaircraft gunners during heavily concentrated air attacks upon the Pantellerian airdrome before the close of the Tunisian campaign did not necessarily indicate lack of spirit on the part of the defenders. It might be that, like Singapore, the island was well fortified against assault from the sea but inadequately prepared to meet attack from the air. 14 In the face of a blockade. its natural resources doubtless would prove wholly inadequate. water supply, derived largely from volcanic springs, was known to be very limited, although it seemed probable that some provision for underground storage had been made. It also was assumed that substantial amounts of ammunition and other supplies had been packed into the extensive caves of the island, by way of preparation for withstanding a siege.

In the absence of more concrete evidence, there were, however, certain promising facts that were known. Through the Intelligence staff it had been learned that the garrison included groups of various sorts. Among these were: a mobile reserve of five infantry battalions, whose personnel had seen no active service; eight machine-gun companies recruited from the Frontier Guard that kept watch on the Alpine porders; and artillery units sufficient to man the different batteries

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and containing, in all probability, a substantial proportion of antiaircraft militia. The morale of troops derived from such sources was
not apt to be high. None of them had become inured to the terrors of
intensive bombardment. Cut off from the mainland, they knew that a
modicum of air protection was the only help for which they could hope.
Already they had received news of the defeat of the Axis forces in
North Africa; and stragglers from Tunisia, who had escaped the vigilance
of naval patrols, had brought them tales of the strength of the Allied
attack. It therefore seemed not unreasonable to suppose that theirs
was a state of mind which could not endure long periods of heavy bombardment. 15


By early May 1943, plans for the seizure and occupation of Pantelleria had been formulated, under the code name of Operation The island itself was to be known as HOBGOBLIN. CORKSCREW. ject presented certain difficulties, however. In the absence of sandy beaches, a landing was considered impracticable if the enemy should make a determined stand. Through offensive air action and bombardment from the sea, it therefore was deemed imperative to break the resistance both of the garrison and of the civilian population to such an extent that a surrender would be attained before the launching of an assault by ground and naval forces. In case a capitulation was not brought about in this way, it was hoped that the damage to materiel, personnel. and morale could be made serious enough to insure for the amphibious landing a fair degree of success, with only minimum losses. 16 As plans for CORKSCREW grew, it was recognized that the effort to capture

Pantelleria might be used as a test of the effectiveness of concentrated heavy bombardment. 17

On the 9th of the month, preparations of a preliminary sort were set in motion by General Eisenhower. Since the operation was a threefold undertaking, Adm. Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, who commanded the naval forces in the Mediterranean, was directed to select a striking force of warships, other vessels and smaller craft necessary for the assault" and naval protection sufficient for the transportation of one infantry division. In conjunction with the Northwest African Coastal Air Force (NACAF) it was also his responsibility to maintain a close blockade of the island. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who as commander of all Allied air forces in the Mediterranean theater exercised authority through a headquarters known as Mediterranean Air Command (MAC), was directed to make available for the operation the full strength of the Northwest African Air Forces -- both strategic and tactical elements -- supplemented, if necessary, by medium and heavy bombers from the Middle East Air Command. For the actual landing operations it had been decided to employ the 1st British Infantry Division -- a unit which had received some training in amphibious warfare before leaving England but was to take no part in the invasion of Sicily. 19

For Operation CORKSCREW a joint command, directly responsible to General Risenhower, was to be exercised by Rear Adm. R. R. McGrigor of the Royal Navy, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of the Northwest African

For the part taken by Motor Torpedo Boat Sq. 15, the only U. S. naval unit participating, see Samuel Eliot Morison, <u>Operations in North African Waters</u>, October 1942-June 1943 (Boston, 1947), pp. 276-78.



Air Forces, and Maj. Gen. W. E. Glutterbuck, the general officer of the latt British Infantry Division. In their hands was placed the command of naval, air, and ground forces respectively. As insurance against undue losses in the event that an assault should prove necessary, these officers were instructed that the Navy and Army Commanders, acting with the advice of the Air Commander, would be responsible for deciding whether the assault should be carried out on the date planned or postponed to allow for further bombardment. In case of the latter decision, these task commanders were ordered to report the situation, along with their recommendations, to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. If in the face of dangerous opposition the project was then ahandoned, General Eisenhower stated that he would assume the responsibility for such a step. 20

Since the Pantellerian operation was to be mounted from Tunisia, an advance element of the NAAF Headquarters was transferred from Constantine, Algeria, to Sousse. There, with representatives of other units participating in the enterprise—assault forces, occupation forces, and Royal Navy—it cooperated in establishing a combined headquarters on 25 May. According to plan, on D-day this advance organization was to be transferred to a headquarters ship, from which it would be in direct contact with all the forces taking part in the operation. If the employment of ground forces should prove necessary, 11 June had been set as the day for the assault. The interval afforded little opportunity for preparation and training, but the choice of date had been determined largely by the time that would be required for the

repair of the Pantellerian air base and the reassembling of naval forces participating in the invasion of Sicily, which was to be launched on 10 July.

Shortness of time was not the only difficulty with which the combined staffs had to contend. In the improvisation of administrative and staff arrangements, it was found that the control of a small-scale operation of this kind by so complex an organization as Allied Force Headquarters (AFRQ) resulted in delay and confusion in the issuance of instructions. Between Algiers and Sousse communications were often unsatisfactory, for the telegraphic system could not always be relied upon and air courier service tended to be irregular and occasionally showed its weakness when speed was of vital importance. Finally, the Northwest African Air Forces were so heavily engaged in operations throughout the planning period that General Spaatz and his assistants found themselves unable to leave Constantine except for a few brief conferences. As a consequence, they were represented at combined headquarters by a skeleton staff only. Messages were shuttled rapidly between Sousse and Constantine, but air courier service was a poor substitute for the close personal liaison which the Army and Navy staffs were able to achieve. As a result, it was discovered at a relatively late stage in the preparations that the target numbers used by the Air Forces differed from those employed by the Army and Navy. Also, operational communications among the three services were never satisfactorily tied. Yet the outcome of the campaign was to prove that these and other difficulties could be surmounted. 22

Chapter II

THE PANTELLERIAN OFFENSIVE

Even before the close of the war in North Africa, attacks upon Pantelleria had been initiated by Allied air forces. The heaviest of these assaults occurred on 8 May 1943, when 33 AAF B-25's along with 89 RAF and SAAF light bombers, dispatched from the Western Desert Air Force, bombed the airdrome on the island, scoring numerous hits on administrative buildings, fuel storage depots, and grounded aircraft. Afterwards escorted bombers of the Northwest African Tactical and Strategic Air Forces also attacked the same target with good results. On one of these later missions a P-38 of the 82d Fighter Group succeeded in skip-bombing a 1,000-1b. bomb against the so-called underground hangar -- not into the south entrance as was originally reported, but against the lintel of one of the doors, where it exploded without causing much damage. On the following day, 34 Mitchells (B-25's) and more than twice as many light bombers renewed the attack upon the airdrome, wrecking various of the 20 aircraft found on the field at the time. On the 10th of the month, large numbers of light and medium bombers concentrated on small shipping in the harbor and bombed the landing ground again. Like missions were flown on succeeding days. Although these attacks resulted in many fires and explosions, few instances of enemy opposition were reported by returning crews during this period.1

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In a strict sense, these early bombings did not represent the beginning of the air offensive against Pantelleria. During the last days of the North African campaign an effort was made, through repeated attacks upon the Pantellerian airfield, to limit the activity of long-range enemy fighters which were based on the island in increasing numbers after the withdrawal of Axis planes from landing grounds in northern Tunisia. By destroying small vessels in the harbor of Porto di Pantelleria and establishing inshore patrols to intercept enemy craft that might put out to sea, the Allies strove to prevent an evacuation movement from North Africa similar to that at Dunkerque. From the point of view of intent, these initial attacks therefore should be regarded more properly as a part of the Tunisian campaign.

Before the enemy had time to recover from the disaster of his surrender in Tunisia on 13 May, the attacks upon Pantelleria begun by the Northwest African Air Forces were continued on an increased scale, and a blockade of the island was instituted by patrols run between it and Sicily and Sardinia. As a supplement to the air effort, a striking force composed of four cruisers, eight destroyers, one gunboat, and ten motor gunboats was organized, with a view to bombarding the island from time to time. These bombardments, it was thought, would serve to test the strength of the enemy's defenses and would tend to confuse him as to the direction of the impending assault.

The fact that the subjugation of enemy territory was being attempted largely through air action gave indication of the formidable power of this kind that the Allies could now bring to bear upon Axis forces

· At

Notes Relating to the Chart on the Opposite Page

THE WAY

It was the Twelfth Air Force that bore the burden of the attack against Pantelleria and Lampedusa, although, along with RAF and SAAF units, the Ninth Air Force was represented in the operations.

Throughout the winter and spring of 1943, the heavy bombers of the Ninth Air Force, still stationed in the Middle East, had continued to strike at enemy airdromes and ports of supply in southern Europe and Sicily. Its medium-bomber and fighter groups, flying with the (Western) Desert Air Force, meanwhile had supported the British Eighth Army in the Allied sweep across Libya and Tunisia. For several months prior to the Pantellerian offensive, these medium-bomber and fighter units had been operating under the direction of the Northwest African Air Forces—a February reorganization that had resulted in part, from the westward movement of the campaign. For the CORKSCREW operation, these Ninth Air Force tactical units were placed as follows:


12th and 340th Bombardment Groups (M), under the operational control of the Tactical Bomber Force

57th and 79th Fighter Groups, operating with the Desert Air Force, on loan to the XII Air Support Command for the Fantellerian operation

[The 324th Fighter Group, also with the Desert Air Force, ran coastal missions, etc., but had no direct part in the Fantellerian action, since the Desert Air Force as such was not a participant.]

Units of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force that flew patrols etc. during the period are not shown on the chart.

STINU 유 THE NORTHWEST **AFRICAN** AIR **FORCES** PARTICIPATING IN THE PANTELLERIAN OPERATION



* Except for the 57th and 79th Fighter Groups, Desert Air Force not represented in operation proper.

* Included by mistake.

operational aircraft of the Northwest Africa. An estimate of the combined operational aircraft of the Northwest African Strategic and Tactical. Air Forces placed the number which they could muster at a figure in the neighborhood of 1,017. In addition, airplanes based on Malta could be counted on to attack enemy airdromes in Sicily and to provide protection for naval forces operating from Maltese ports. By comparison, the enemy was reported, about the middle of May, to have over 900 combat planes on Sicily, Sardinia, and the toe of Italy, at bases within reach of Pantelleria.

For the CORKSCREW operation, the units of the Northwest African Strategic Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, were located in the areas of Constantine, Souk El Arba, and Djedeida. The NASAF consisted of the following units: four groups of B-17's (the 2d, 97th, 99th, and 301st Bombardment Groups); two of B-25's (the 310th and 321st Bombardment Groups); three of B-26's (the 17th, 319th, and 320th Bombardment Groups); three of P-38's (the 1st, 14th, and 82d Fighter Groups); one of P-40's (the 325th Fighter Group): and several wings of Wellingtons from the RAF Middle East Command. The Strategic Air Force, almost as a whole, was therefore committed to the Pantellerian operation. Its American elements were organized into three bombardment wings: 10 the Fortresses with two groups of Lightnings formed the 5th Wing, while the Mitchells with one group of Lightnings and the Marauders with the single group of Warhawks comprised the 47th and the 2686th (Prov.) Wings, respectively. 11 Although the role of the pursuit groups was largely that of furnishing fighter escort for

the bombers, they engaged, to a lesser extent, in fighter-sweep and dive-bombing missions, which contributed substantially to the vigor of the attack.

On the other hand, the Northwest African Tactical Air Force, commanded by Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, was only partially devoted to the Pantellerian offensive. In fact, the composition of the NATAF had just undergone a radical change. Upon completion of the Tunisian campaign, No. 242 Group (RAF), with its large number of fighter squadrons already operating in the Bizerte-Sousse area, had been transferred to the Northwest African Coastal Air Force, in order to assist in sea sweeps and the protection of convoys; two Spitfire wings were in process of moving to Malta for participation in the Sicilian invasion; and the Western Desert Air Force was returning to its main base at Tripoli in preparation for the same operation. As a consequence, only units of the XII Air Support Command and of the Tactical Bomber Force were available to NATAF for the Pantellerian project. 18 Because of the shortage of fighter-bombers, two U. S. groups of P-40's from the Western Desert Air Force-the 57th and 79th Fighter Groupswere retained in Tunisia. 13 In addition, the XII Air Support Command was reinforced by the 99th Fighter Squadron, a unit that had arrived in Northwest Africa the previous month (April 1943). 14 It was further strengthened by the refitting of the 27th Bombardment Group (L) with A-36 aircraft, a type of fighter-bomber that had only recently made its appearance in the theater. 15

For purposes of rest and refitting it had been decided that, at the end of the Tunisian campaign, the Tactical Air Force should be moved into areas near the coast. In general, the units of the XII Air Support Command were stationed on the east side of the Cap Bon peninsula. 16 while those of the Tactical Bomber Force, situated at its foot, occupied bases extending as far south as Hergla. 17 These locations had been chosen with the Sicilian invasion in mind, and a number of landing grounds had been constructed there for use in that undertaking. As a consequence, these airfields were ideally placed for the Pantellerian operation. 18

In accordance with the plan for CORKSCREW adopted on 23 May, the air attack was to be divided into two periods. Through 6 June (D-5), Pantelleria would be subjected to heavy bombardment, which was to be increased decidedly at the end of May. From 7 June (D-4) to dawn on the 11th (D-day), the island would be attacked around the clock, with an intensity growing from 200 sorties on the first day to 1,500 or 2,000 on the last (D-1). This responsibility was to be borne jointly by the Northwest African Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, with each organization normally providing its own fighter escort. During the first period. it was estimated that an average of 50 bomber and 50 fighter-bomber sorties would be required each day. Until 31 May, this effort was to be furnished by the Strategic Air Force. Thereafter, the total number of fighter-bombers would be supplied by the Tactical Air Force--an obligation assumed by the XII Air Support Command. 19 In the interim. the fighter-bombers of this organization would not be entirely idle, for some of them were to operate as nulsance raiders against gun

emplacements, technical installations, vehicular movements, and inshore 20 shipping. After 1 June, however, they would be assigned specific targets consisting primarily of gun positions in the vicinity of the 21 harbor.

In order to avoid indication that Pantelleria had been singled out for invasion, care was taken to bomb targets in Sardinia, Sicily, and Italy, too. although these bombings were aimed largely at enemy supply and operational bases in preparation for the Sicilian campaign, they nevertheless gave diversionary support to the current operation and put additional strain on Italian resources. During the last two weeks in May, for example, the strategic bombing of airdromes and landing grounds in the vicinity of La Maddalena, Cagliari, and Decimomannu in Sardinia, Trapani and Messina in Sicily, and mainland cities south of Maples proved to be of particular value, in that not only were many axis aircraft destroyed but the enemy was hampered in the transfer of This interference constituted a serious cardicap, for Aiscoveries made through allied serial photography indicated Mat Le mas obliged, in the course of the period, to shift heavy concentrations of long-range bembers from Sardinia to Sicily and, finally, to southern as Forthwest African air Forces attacked these targets day after day, the number of aircraft which they were able to send on these missions is reported to have made a deep impression upon the Italians. To some, it undoubtedly suggested the hopelcseness of fighting against advergaries possessed of such power and resources.

The offensive against Pantelleria may be said to have begun on

18 May, with an attack by medium and flighter-bombers of the Strategic Air Force. 26 The attacking formations were composed of 42 B-25's and. 44 B-26's, escorted by 91 P-38's and P-40's, of which about 40 carried bombs. Some of the planes returned early, but the remainder succeeded in dropping more than 97 tons of bombs on the island. Docks and jetties were damaged; coastal guns adjacent to Porto di Pantelleria were struck; and one boat received a direct hit when a string of bombs fell among a number of small craft in the harbor. Bombs also were dropped on the airdrome, where fires were started in barracks and administration buildings, and damage was done to aircraft on the perimeter of the field. 27 The missions of the next few days were less spectacular, but on the 23d, 72 medium and 16 fighter-bombers showered 76 tons of bombs upon the island. For the following night of 23/24 May and the day of the 24th, the combined bombing-loads of Wellingtons and P-40's totaled more than During this period the Northwest African Air Forces encountered little fighter opposition over Pantelleria, because German and Italian Air Forces (GAF and IAF) obviously were striving to reestablish their units in time to meet an Allied offensive. Despite the lack of fighter protection, Pantelleria was not entirely defenseless, for returning crews occasionally brought reports of having experienced severe antiaircraft fire from well-concealed gun positions on the island. 29

Early operations of the Pantellerian offensive were directed chiefly against the airfield and the port, in an effort to prevent the enemy from amassing on the island reserves of water, food, and munitions

against a possible siege. Through naval patrols and attacks from the air the Allies had succeeded in maintaining a blockade, yet supplies continued to be brought to the belonguered garrison by Ju-52's and sea transport. 30 In making the short crossing from Sicily, small craft such as LOT's and Siebel ferries generally were used. 31 Most of these were unloaded in the inner harbor of Porto di Pantelleria, from which vessels of more than a 10-foot draught were excluded. From photographic reconnaissance carried out on five days of the week 22 to 29 May, it was learned that small craft in large enough numbers for the delivery of 630 tons of supplies had reached the island during that period. This total probably represented a conservative estimate, as some cargoes doubtless were discharged by craft entering or leaving the port between reconnaissance missions, or on the two days when the island failed to be covered. Within this interval, however, several small vessels were hit in air raids, and considerable damage was done to harbor facilities. Increased effectiveness of the blockade and of attacks from the air was shown by the limited deliveries made between 29 May and 4 June. During this week, in which at least one photographic mission over the port was flown every day, the only supplies known to have come in by sea were carried by one LCT, a small fishing boat, and a 185-foot coaster. In fact, so effective were the attacks of the medium and fighter-bombers in disrupting shipping that, before the end of May, Pantelleria was practically isolated. 32

Aerial reconnaissance for the last half of the month also confirmed the success of the attacks upon the Pantellerian airdrome. The main

barracks there and administrative buildings near the underground hangar were shown to have been destroyed by direct hits, and there were indications that stores and dumps had been fired. The airfield itself appeared to be closely dotted with craters, but obviously many of the holes had been filled. Despite repeated bombings, a portion of the field seems to have been kept in some sort of repair throughout the greater part of the campaign, for, as late as 9 June, a number of Ju-52's were reported to have made a landing upon it. 33 Damage to aircraft on the ground was, however, considerable. By 29 May, one Ju-52 appeared to be the only sound airplane on the field. On the following day, no serviceable aircraft was seen—a state of affairs that afforded partial explanation for the lack of opposition encountered by Allied missions in the early stage of the attack.

Desirous of learning how the enemy was enduring the strain of bombardment and in what state of alert the island was kept, the Allies had attempted to land on Pantelleria at two different times. In both instances adverse weather conditions accounted for the failure. On the night of 28/29 May a third attempt met with greater success, for a party of eight was then set ashore at Punta Kharace. Despite the extreme unsuitability of the place for a major attack, it was found that entries were posted here at intervals of 150 to 200 yards. After two hours ashore, the group succeeded in capturing one of the guards for interrogation—but not in time to prevent him from giving the alarm. In the struggle that ensued, three Italians were killed, and one British soldier was so seriously wounded that he had to be left behind.

Other members of the party managed to withdraw, but, owing to lack of concerted action and to the precipitous character of the cliffs, they could not take the prisoner with them. As a consequence, the main purpose of the raid was defeated, although it was noted that there were no evidences of German troops on the island.

Within a few days, however, firsthand information regarding conditions on the island was gleaned from prisoners of war captured from the motor schooner Stella Maris. en route from Pantelleria to Trapani, Sicily. 37 The accounts of these men, supplemented by reports from photographic reconnaissance missions, indicated that the bombing attacks had badly disrupted life on the island. In fact, the unloading of the Stella Maris seemed to have been accomplished only through the efforts of personnel from machine-gun battalions, although customhouse guards also were seen. 38 Apparently about seven acres of the town of Pantelleria had been demolished, and the roads leading from it were so choked with debris as to be virtually impassable. From interrogation of the prisoners. it was learned that, with the town untenable, the population had been evacuated to underground quarters or had sought refuge among the hills in the more remote parts of the island. Militiamen, on the other hand, crowded into trenches during the raids, while gun crews found shelter in the tunnels and alleyways leading from the batteries to the ammunition lockers. 39 Acquisition of this information tended to strengthen the belief that the initial stage of the Allied air attack had met with reasonable success.

In the defense of Pantelleria, the airfield and port played only a

minor part. As a consequence, a relatively slight effort was sufficient to render them ineffectual. It was coastal batteries and gun emplacements that formed the principal targets. Since neutralisation of these positions by area bombing would have proved a long and wasteful process, careful analysis of the defensive system of the island was made. Assessment of the importance of each installation to the system as a whole enabled planners of the operation to allocate priorities to specific pinpointed objectives. In the reduction of gun positions, the attack was planned systematically, with considerable reliance placed upon Intelligence. especially that resulting from photographic reconnaissance. 40 The scheme was based largely on mosaic maps and oblique photographs indicating the location of the coastal defenses, while the scale of effort was determined by the calculations of a special group headed by the Oxford scientist, Professor/Zuckerman. In order to follow accurately the results of each mission, the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing had a cover of the Pantellerian batteries made at least once a day until 5 June. After that date, the coverage was increased several times. with as many as five photographic missions being flown on 11 June (D-day). The work of interpreting the films was done at NAAF Headquarters, where target priorities were assigned daily on the basis of assessments made from the strike photographs. In fact, the maintenance of a constant check through aerial reconnaissance of this kind constituted an essential part of the operation. 41

The standard target map used throughout the offensive was a groundair map of Pantelleria, on the scale of 1:25,000. In giving designations

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ascribed to prominent places and features shown on the map. Twenty bettery positions, the principal targets located from photographs and other intelligence sources, were assigned numbers for use in a similar way. All other map references were indicated by the giving of coordinates up to six figures. 42

Responsibility for all briefing rested upon Intelligence—and proved a burden by no means light. Yet the results of all operations were promptly available in the war room, for each local headquarters maintained direct communications with the airfields in its vicinity. In this way, accounts of flights were received soon after completion of the missions. At regular intervals a consolidated report was telephoned to SAF and TAF Headquarters, from which operational summaries (QPSUMS) were sent out by teletype several times a day. These, in turn, were incorporated into a daily operational and intelligence summary issued by NAAF Headquarters. Up to D-day, however, the sources of information were largely photographic. It was therefore necessary for Intelligence to maintain very close liaison with units making the photographic sorties and to see that the delivery of prints was made almost immediately. As a consequence, the Pantellerian operation furnished a good example of the basic importance of this kind of reconnaissance.

Although NAAF Headquarters rigidly prescribed the daily bomber effort required of both the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, making specifications as to details of target, bomb load, and fuzing, a forward bomber control unit was maintained at the headquarters of the XII Air

Support Command at Korba, in the Cap Bon area. In order to facilitate the assembling of fighters and bombers for missions to the island, it had been decided that all formations normally should fly by way of a small cape near Kelibia, both on their departure from, and return to, the mainland. Such an arrangement had the added advantage of simplifying the work of the air-sea rescue units, which were operating, with a limited force, from Bizerte, Tunis, and Sfax. Because of the intensity of the fighter effort during the concentrated attack upon Pantelleria, it was necessary to keep the fighter escort reduced to an essential minimum. For tactical bomber formations composed of 12 aircraft, a close escort of six fighter planes was considered adequate, for example.

In order that Allied surface craft might approach Pantelleria without meeting with pronounced opposition, it had been decided that the bombing attack should be concentrated upon the coastal-defense and dual-purpose batteries in the northern half of the island. Since positions of this kind would be affected by direct hits and near misses only, the degree of bombing accuracy that could be expected against targets so small and difficult of location was recognized as the chief factor in determining the necessary scale of attack. In the destruction of very strong positions, experiments elsewhere had shown that, ton for ton, the U. S. 1,000-lb. general-purpose bomb, fused for .025 seconds delay, and the British 1,000-lb. MC bomb yielded better results than any others then available. In the absence of detailed information concerning the character of the batteries on the island, it seemed advisable to consider them of sufficient strength to warrant the use of bombs of this

size. Preliminary estimates of the effort required therefore were based, in part, on the assumption that critical damage to the guns on Pantelleria would be caused by the 1,000-lb. bembs falling, perhaps, at no greater distance than eight yards from the target—a radius that would give a circular area of approximately 200 square yards. For an equal number of 1,000-lb. and 500-lb. bombs, the vulnerable area was placed at 160 square yards. In all probability, the debris thrown up by bursts both within and without these areas would act as secondary missiles which, in turn, would heighten the disruptive effect of the bombs—considerations that led, for planning purposes, to the adoption of a larger area of vulnerability for some of the guns. It also was held that pillboxes, trenches, breastworks, and other fertifications in the vicinity of the harbor would be affected by spill from attacks upon adjacent batteries, and from the night bombardment of the port and the term. 47

under the best of sonditions, the neutralization of strong, wellmanned defensive positions from the air was considered a difficult task.

Such installations had proved relatively immune to attack by medium, light, and fighter-bember planes; for heavy bombers, they constituted pin-point targets in the strict sense of the term. Up to this time, lack of adequate air power had prevented the making of any such attempt on a large scale.

In these circumstances, the present operation became virtually a laboratory experiment in which the tactical possibilities of this kind of air attack would be tested.

Throughout the engagement, the NAAF employed the services of Professor S. Zuckerman, the scientific advisor borrowed from the British Combined Operations Staff for the purpose of analyzing the relation between effort and effect in this operation.

Estimates based on the law of averages and on an analysis of the bembing accuracy of heavy bembers indicated that, in order to give an even chance of knocking out a gun having a vulnerable area of 600 square yards, as many as four hundred 1,600-lb. bembs must be aimed at the target. The assault upon Pantelleria therefore was planned with no idea of trying to drop a bemb on each of the 80 guns singled out for attack. Such an undertaking would have required a prolenged and sizable effort beyond all reason. If, however, a little more than a 30 per cent reduction could be achieved—that is, if as many as two out of six guns in each battery could be rendered useless—there was reason to believe that the silencing of the remainder would follow from secondary causes. Since a task of these prepertions was considered well within the capacity of the forces available, the bembing effort required to insure the desired results was then calculated mathematically. 50

From the start, it seemed advisable to assess the extent of damage done to defensive positions in terms of the reduction of the fire power of the guns. While direct destruction of these defenses would contribute most substantially to such a reduction, it was recognized that secondary factors also would play a significant part. Among considerations of this kind could be included the disruption of communications, the demolition of scientific instruments, the destruction of essential supplies, casualties, and, finally, the demoralization brought on by repeated bombings. Throughout the operation, duration of effect was regarded as important—particularly so, since the air attack was to be followed by naval and land assaults.

Even if only partial destruction of the coastal defenses were accomplished, it was held that continuous bombardment would give no opportunity for repairs

and replacements. By removing the possibility of maintenance work, this type of interference might well prolong a period of unserviceability into one of usulnamers. In this way, it was believed that additional neutralisation sufficient to permit the making of assaults and landings would result. 51

In accordance with the general eperational plan, the air offensive against Pantelleria was intensified at the end of May. On the 29th of the menth, \$4 tens of bombs were dropped on the island by medium and fighter-bembers, scoring hits in the areas of the dock and the town, where fires and explosions were noted. In the course of the following night (29/30 May), 22 Wellingtons attacked the island at several different times, dropping two block-busters and a sufficient number of smaller bombs to make a total of 42.5 tons. 52 On the 30th, the bomb loads added up to more than 77 tens, and on the last day of May, the figure rose to 90 or more tons. Thereafter the bembing continued on an increased scale. From dawn to dusk Mitchells, Marauders, Lightnings, and Warhawks pounded the island every few hours. 53 At night the attack was carried on by RAF Wellington's, which, up to this time, had operated only occasionally.

On 1 June, the bembing of two artillery batteries by 19 B-17's marked the entry of the heavy bembers into the CORKSCREW operation. Their bomb leads, coupled with those of the Wellingtons, the P-38's, and the P-40's which had pounded the island in the course of the 24 hours, approximated 141 tons. For 2 June, the weight of dropped bombs was slightly less than 133 tens, but for the following day it fell to 114 tons. Among the aircraft engaged in the attacks on the 3d of the month were five Bostons, the first

planes of the kind to take part in the offensive. With the Wellingtons dropping 58 tons of bombs on the night of 3/4 June, and the B-17's again active by day, the total weight of the bomb load for the next 24-hour period rose to 200 tons and over. In addition to the Flying Fortresses, 18 B-25's, 18 B-26's, and more than 100 P-38's and P-40's participated in the effensive on 4 June. Throughout the period, the attacks of the fighter-bombers had been most effective, and their increased use during these last few days marked an important trend in the week's operations.

On 5 June, the concentration of the heavy-bomber effort against the Spexia naval base on the Ligurian coast prevented the Flying Fortresses from engaging in the Pantellerian assault. The large-scale operations of the Wellingtons compensated in part for their absence, in that on the previous night (4/5 June) the RAF bombers had dropped block-buster, 1,000-lb., 500-lb., and 250-lb. bombs, totaling 30 tons. Through the daytime activity of B-25's, 52 additional tons were cascaded upon the island—a blow intensified by the attacks of almost 100 Lightnings and Warhawks, carrying bomb leads of more than 33 tons. In all, the weight of bombs released in the course of the 24 hours equaled 116 tons. Since the beginning of the offensive on 18 May, the Northwest African Air Forces were now reported to have blasted Pantelleria with approximately 1,339 tons of bombs—a tonnage that represented a pulverising attack upon an island slightly less than half the size of Malta. 55

According to plan, the bombing effort of the Strategic Air Force was supplemented on 6 June (D-5) by the introduction of Bostons, Baltimores, and Mitchells of NATAF's Tactical Bomber Force. 56 Inasmuch as the escert

for the latter organization was to be furnished by the XII Air Support Command, additional fighter units were drawn into the operation as the tactical bomber effort grew. ⁵⁷ At this time (D-5), the daily sorties which had ranged from 100 to 150, were increased to 200 or more. Thereafter, the number was doubled or trebled until a climax was reached on D-1 (June 10). ⁵⁸

Preliminary to the heavy assault of 6 June, formations of Wellingtons had attacked Pantelleria on the night of 5/6 June, dropping 40 tons of bombs. Operations of the day itself were carried out by a formidable force of American, British, and South African bombers that swept down on the island, showering it with bomb leads approximating 191 tons, thus making the tonnage for the 24-hour period 231 tons. Flying Fortresses again, were not represented in these missions, as the B-17's were inactive after their long-range attack against Spesia on the preceding day.

The concentrated attack upon Pantelleria, scheduled to begin on 7 June, was introduced with the dropping of some 600 tons of bombs—a tennage between two and three times as great as that released on any day of the offensive up to this time. Hurribomber and Wellington sorties preceded the missions flown by heavy, medium, and fighter-bombers against targets consisting largely of shore batteries. Although on the previous day A-36's had made reconnaissance flights ever the island, their missions of 7 June, directed against gum positions on the northeast coast and small craft in the vicinity of Porte di Scauri, marked their entrance into the effensive. During the remainder of the campaign these light bombers were to give a good account of themselves. 59

From the commencement of the intensive air attack late in May, the weight of the effensive had been directed primarily against coastal and

antiaircraft defenses, especially these in the vicinity of the port. facilitate their destruction, a series of mayal bembardments had been plan The first of these occurred in the very early morning of 31 May when M.M.S. Orion, escerted by H.M. destroyers Troubridge and Petard, task position off the northwest coast of the island and bemberded the harber area at a range of 13,000 yards. To the firing of 150 rounds of six-inch and small-caliber shells, the enemy effered only slight opposition. At the sension of the attack, the British ships withdrew without having sustained either casualties er damage. In the later afternoon of the fellowing day (1 June), the British light cruiser Penelope, in company with H.M. destroyers Paladin and Petard, engaged in a similar mission. During the shelling, a plane from the 15th Phetographic Squadron flew over the western end of the island at an altitude of 20,000 feet, locating gun emplacements and recording action between naval units and shore batteries. In the course of the bembardment, hits were scored on barracks and gun-position areas. Return of the Penelope's fire by five shore batteries resulted in the ship's receiving a direct hit which caused little damage. This resistance on the part of the enemy was replaced by intermittent opposition when the Orion, under escert of the Paladin and Troubridge, renewed the attack on the night of 2/3 June while one Albacore dropped flares to help the naval bombardment and another spetted the fall of the shells. 63 Early the next morning, the bombardment of the inner harbor by H.M.S. Isis and Ilex was answered by one salvo only. At dawn on 5 June, coastal batteries again were successfully attacked, but only inaccurate fire was encountered as the ships turned away. These trial missions showing the enemy's unwillingness to engage in combat were

interpreted as indicating one, or both, of two things. Rither the daily bembing raids of the MAF during the last two weeks had decreased the firing power of the enemy's defense guns, or, until the development of a full-scale attack, he was reluctant to disclose his positions and to draw upon himself the accurate retaliatory fire which, he knew, would follow the flash of his guns.

By way of testing the amount of destruction produced by air and naval attacks upon defensive positions, a full-scale naval bembardment was carried out in the forences of 8 June. The tack force chosen for the mission consisted of three meter terpode boats, the craisers Newfoundland, Aurora, Penelspe, Enryalne, and Orion, and the destroyers Whadden, Troubridge, Tartar, Jervis, Hubian, Laferey, Lookeut, and Loyal, which served as a screen against possible danger from U-boats. Under fighter and fighter-bember cover, the little armada led by the Aurora set out for Pantelleria. Upon reaching their station point, the ships swung into a huge are just as a group of Mitchells and Lightnings turned homeward from a bomb run over the island. In their wake dust and smoke drifted out to sea, covering the target, which was to be the dock area in the vicinity of the harber and the coastal batteries located on the neighboring escarpment.

The assault itself was divided into two periods. The earlier phase consisted of a series of salvos fired by the five cruisers—first at the mole, which could be distinguished by a high crane, and then at the dock, which was located some distance to the right. After that, all vessels turned away in an attempt to draw fire before attacking again. The second phase was launched in conjunction with an attack on the western batteries

by B-17's--an onslaught of such weight that the little island appeared to observers to be lifted from the sea, and even the ships off shore were shaken violently. In order to present tempting targets, the eight destroyers then moved to a position within 2,000 yards of the shore. By that time, two coastal batteries were operating fitfully and already had fired some 30 shells which had been seen to burst in the water without causing any damage. The destroyers promptly fired their feur-inoh guns at close range and, after spreading heavy smeke screens, sped away to join the departing cruisers. Subsequent reconnaissance showed that, with the exception of four lighters, all small vessels in the harbor had been sunk.

While the destroyers had taken their stand inshere, the three moter torpedo boats (MTB's) had dashed toward the mole and made a series of runs across the mouth of the port, at a distance of 300 yards instead of the 1,000-yard range stipulated in their orders. This spirited action succeeded in provoking a few machine-gun posts into giving away their locations but, on the whole, the retaliation was slight. Out of 16 batteries that could have engaged the attacking ships, had they been serviceable and well manned, two returned fire throughout much of the operation; one fired until it was silenced by a cruiser; and three others responded intermittently. From the flagship Aurora General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham had watched the operation, which lasted about an hour and a quarter. On the way back to North Africa, the results of the shelling were appraised. From the inaccuracy of the enemy gunfire observers were led to conclude that the fire-control mechanism of some of the batteries was no longer working. Although no surrender had been forthcoming, the cutcome of the maneuver indicated that the critical batteries had been rendered useless, and that

the day-by-day air analysis of the bombing results was conservative. On the basis of this evidence, it therefore was decided that plans for the assault by ground forces could be adhered to with confidence. Since the bombardment would be sustained until 11 June, there was reason to believe that, by that time, the morale of the defenders would be sufficiently shattered for the invading troops to carry out the assault with only few losses. 67

The repeated naval attacks against Pantelleria and the successful had blockade of the island during the past few weeks/amply demonstrated the extent of Allied air superiority in the central Mediterranean. Operating in conjunction with Allied air forces and under a fighter umbrella, British naval units had moved with comparative freedom and had gradually enlarged their sphere of operations as the air attacks were extended northward. The Italian fleet, on the other hand, was now forced to remain in port, because of the inability of enemy shore-based aircraft to protect ships at sea and to halt. Allied flights against Italy's insular possessions and her mainland.

According to the general operational plan, the air offensive against Pantelleria was to be interrupted twice by a call to surrender, ence on D-3 and again on D-1 day. The first of these lulls occurred on 8 June, immediately after the naval bombardment, which served as a fitting prelude to it. From a group of volunteers, three pilets of the 33d Fighter Group had been selected for the mission. While a diversionary force operated elsewhere over the island, these pilets flew in "on the deck"—one over the airport, one over the public square of the town of Pantelleria, and one over the residence of the military governor—to drop demands for surrender. The stipulations of the Allies were embodied in a message addressed to the

povernor and set in triplicate. In addition to immediate constitute of hostilities, the terms included the unconditional surrender of all armed forces, who would become prisoners of war, and the abandonment of all military installations, which were to be left intact. In case the garrison wished to capitulate, it was directed to display a white cross on the airdrone and to fly a white flag in the harbor area. Immediately after the demands for surrender had been dropped, planes of the Tastical Bember Force released thousands of leaflets, informing both the garrison and the civilian population of the futility of further resistance and stating that, in the hope of sparing islanders the ordeal of continued bombings, a call to surrender had been made. 68

This invitation contained a more direct appeal than the one made in the sheets which Wellington bombers had been showering upon Pantelleria in the course of the past few weeks. Those pamphlets emphasized the strength of the Allied air force and advised soldiers and civilians alike to keep away from military objectives; they quoted speeches of Allied leaders on the subject of Italy and described the Tunisian campaign in terse and clear-cut fashion. Such arguments—and those presented in the current leaflets—may not have been without effect, but when no token of surrender was displayed in the course of the six-hour respite prescribed, the air bombardment was resumed. 70

In conformity with the warning given to the enemy, the concentrated attack, begun on 7 June, was now continued with greater intensity. On 8 June almost 700 tons of bombs were dropped, and on the following day the weight of the bomb load rose to more than 822 tons. The brunt of these

leads was borne by B-17's, but large numbers of bombs also were carried by various types of medium, light, and fighter-bembers engaged in the offensive. 71 The Tactical Bember Force, which operated during the daylight heurs, usually performed its bembing missions in the early merning and evening, while these of the Strategie Air Force were carried out at other times. 72 Fighter-sweeps and dive-bembing raids took place independently or were ordered in connection with operations scheduled throughout the day. Continuity of attack was insured, in large measure, by tabulating the serties expected of the Tactical Air Perce and listing their time of arrival over the target -- a program adhered to as strictly as possible -- in order that the bembing might be distributed ever the period allotted. On some missions part of the escerting aircraft, too, carried bombs, which they drepped before assuming their active role as protector to the bombers. At night, Wellingtons hammered at the island and, from dusk until such time as these RAF medium bembers began their operations, Hurribembers of No. 241 Squadren (RAF) conducted harassing raids. Throughout the 24 hours Pantelleria was therefore pounded relentlessly. During the last five days of the attack, a total of/4,790 tons of bombs was dropped-an undertaking which not only showed the determination of the Allies to reduce the island, but also indicated the strength of the air power at their disposal for the purpose. 73

Initially the bombardment of Pantelleria from the air had met with remarkably little Axis interference, ewing primarily to the severe losses which the enemy had suffered in combat and to the number of his planes that had been destroyed on the ground. So preneunced had been the lack of eppesition during the week fellowing the surrender in North Africa that

the appearance of enemy fighters at the end of May had pointed to an influx of new pilots and aircraft into Sicily and Sardinia. Under provocation of progressively more intensive attacks, the enemy had reacted to the extent of dispatching, from Castelvetrane and Sciacca or other Sicilian bases, small groups of intercepting planes, and occasionally even a sweep of ten or more aircraft, both German and Italian. The first conspicuous encounter of this kind occurred on 5 June, when 15 to 20 Me-109's and FW-190's intercepted a fermation of Mitchells and Lightnings over the island. On the next day the German planes were more numerous, and, on the following one, Italian fighters also appeared. On the whole, the efforts of the enemy seemed only half-hearted, although, in the early morning of 7 June, a lew-level fighter-bember attack was made on the landing grounds of Korba North in Tunisia, and on the night of 10/11 June Sousse was raided by an enemy force consisting of approximately 50 bembers. 75

As Allied bombings increased on 8 and 9 June, enemy fighter activity showed a tendency to decline, but was revived again on the 10th and 11th, when the heaviest Allied attacks were experienced. The intervention of these Sicilian-based fighters led to their suffering substantial losses without, in any way, impeding Allied operations. In all, several hundred enemy planes were seen during these first 11 days of June, with 57 destroyed, 10 probably destroyed, and 21 damaged.

The general outline for the Pantellerian offensive had provided for especially heavy bembardment on 10 June, when a decisive blow was to be delivered. During the preceding night, Wellingtons and Hurribombers had carried out vigorous raids, and, at first light, other bombers resumed the

offensive. An early morning mist interfered with the first of these missions, but after its disappearance a continuous stream of attack was directed against the island. As wave after wave of bombers swept over former Tunisian battlefields and out across the Mediterranean, observers were struck by the power of the aerial weapon which the Allies had forged --an impression that deepened as they became aware of the size of the day's operations. According to one observer, bombers on their outward flight were sometimes passed by accompanying P-38's carrying bombs and hurrying to attack before them; sometimes they were met by returning medium or heavy bombers, or a group of P-40's on their way home to re-form and set out again. 77 Upon reaching Pantelleria the bombers sometimes found it necessary to circle, in order to give earlier arrivals opportunity for bombing. With Spitfires watching overhead, they made their own bomb runs and then turned homeward, flying in loose formation and even medifying their course, on occasion, so that more planes could drive toward the target. This routine was maintained throughout the day, with the exception of a three-hour lull allowed for the second call to surrender. When the demand remained unanswered at the close of the period, the air assault was resumed. 79

Earlier in the day the bombing objectives had consisted of a variety of targets in the northern half of the island—gun positions, buildings, and installations of different kinds. In preparation for an opposed landing, special attention was new given to the coastal batteries in the vicinity of the harbor. By the end of the day, more than 1,760 sorties had been flown by heavy, medium, light, and fighter-bombers, carrying bombs

ranging from 250 to 1,000 lbs. in weight. As a result, many hits, explosions, and fires were reported, although dust and make sometimes prevented the taking of accurate observations. Of the immireds of beads dropped in the course of the day, the Strategie Air Force alone was credited with having carried a number totaling 1,300 tens. Strong resistance on the part of the enemy was frequently encountered but, despite this opposition, some 30 Axis aircraft were destroyed at small cost to the Allies. 82

As soon as it was seen that the second call to surrender had failed to meet with response, final preparations for the ground assault were completed. With the object of capturing Pantelleria, the British 1st Infantry Division embarked at Sousse and Sfax on the night of 10/11 June. Since the last week in May these troops had been under tutelage for the mission, and had received special training, which included two landing rehearsals in the harbor of Sousse on 4 and 6 June. Owing, however, to widespread troop movements and the number of training programs in progress along the North African shore at the time, it had been manecessary to devise cover plans for concealing their exercises or these of the naval craft engaged.

The expedition set out in three conveys, two fast and one slew. At the time of departure clouds hid the moon, making the night so dark that enemy aircraft, on a routine raid to Sousse, dropped a few bombs in the vicinity of the ships, apparently without knowing it. Off Pantelleria, about daybreak, the two fast conveys were met by a naval squadron from Malta. Sailing in company from the point of rendesvous, these ships reached their appointed station eight miles from the harber entrance to

Porto di Penselleria et 6955 nouro. There the assenit craft, lowered from the Infantry landing shipe Green Russ, Princess Beatrix, and Reyal Visterman, took positions on either beam of the last vessel, along with several motor launches, four flak craft, and a number of infantry landing craft. Around them five escerting destroyers, joined by trawlers and mine sweepers, maintained an endless chain of antisubmarine patrola, while fighters from the Northwest African Coastal Air Force wheeled and circled everhead, marding off threats both from sea and air. 87

In the course of the night Pantelleria had been heavily attacked by Wallingtons and Hurribembers and subjected to bembardment by the destroyers Paladin and Potard. ** At daybreak, the clouds which began to form with the rising of the sun were regarded with anxiety, for it was feared that they would interfere with the activity of the heavy bembers, and might provide protection sufficient to enable enemy fighter-bembers to pierce the Allied fighter screen. As the merning were on, an occasional burst of antimizeraft fire from a cruiser and activity on the part of the fighters indicated that enemy planes had taken advantage of the cloud cover. Although a number of these speradic attacks occurred throughout the day, no ship was struck, and at no time were the attacks of sufficient strength to interfere with landing operations.

Fellowing a prearranged schedule, the Tactical Bomber Force had begun its bombing very early in the morning. For final attacks upon gun positions and the removal of possible opposition from the shore, formations of medium bembers with fighter escort were sent over the island on an average of every 15 minutes. To men who watched the attack from the decks of the waiting conveys, the precision of their performance was so marked that the units

might have been giving an air demonstration instead of helping to bomb an island into submission. Every plane seemed to be in station and every mission apparently arrived over the target at the appointed time—an important factor in the success of a sharply defined program such as this. The fact that the formations were maintained at full strength speke well for the Allied aircraft, and for the ground crews that had serviced them at the dusty airdromes in North Africa. 91

With the completion of its round of bembing missions soon after 1000 hours, the duties of the Tactical Air Force became largely those of furnishing fighter cover for the battle area, and of operating in comjunction with the ground forces. Except for a small number of prearranged flights, all TAF activities were now to be controlled by the air force officer in the combined headquarters. For convenience, the control organization had been transferred to H.M.S. Large, where it was to remain until its establishment on Pantelleria could be effected—an achievement that would be accomplished before the end of the day, it was hoped. As provision against the possible sinking of the Large, a stand-by headquarters, which included an air officer, had been stationed on board H.M.S. Reyal Ulsterman, in readiness to act in such an emergency.

Between 1000 and 1100 hours, when the Strategic Air Force would continue the attack, there came a lull of approximately an hour in the bembing pregram. 93 In the course of the interval, a large formation of enemy FW-190's approached the flotilla, but dropped their bombs near the Greek destroyer Queen Olgs without causing any damage. While the cruisers and destroyers maneuvered in intricate fashion, the attacking force was driven off by

[&]quot;It was the <u>Nubian</u>, according to CinCMED (Admiral Cunningham), "The Occupation of Pantelleria and the Subsequent Capture of Lampedusa, Lampione, and Linosa," 30 Nov. 1943, Incl. 2.

Allied fighter planes. At approximately 1030 hours, the assault craft, under cover of the guns on the ships, headed for shore. On the way to the island their safety was threatened by the appearance of five Me-109's preparing to attack. Owing to the vigilance of some P-40's from the 57th Fighter Group, the enemy planes not only were forced to jettison their bombs, but lost one of their number in the combat that ensued. Upon the arrival of the slow convey at about 1100 hours, the landing craft took their places on the port beam of the Royal Ulsterman, awaiting orders to be called to the beaches. At the same time, ships of the Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron—followed an hour later by the gunboat Aphis and eight destroyers—opened fire on shore targets previously assigned them. To this attack several coastal gans replied with shots which fortunately missed their marks.

Meanwhile, at about 1100 hours, aircraft attacking installations on Midway Hill, which lies between the town and the airdrome, had caught sight of a white cross on the airfield and had wheeled for home, with bomb bay doors unopened. Tet one white cross alone did not meet the prescribed tokens of surrender. Besides, there were indications from the continued firing by several batteries that, even if the governor had given orders to capitulate, a part of the garrison, at least, was still unaware of these instructions, ewing, in all probability, to disruption of communications. Inasmuch as the assault craft were then approaching the beaches and could not be recalled, it was decided that no risks should be taken. The original plan for giving full air cover to the ground forces during the initial phase of the occupation of the island was therefore followed. The warships were ordered to carry out their prearranged program of bombardment until the

assault craft touched down, and thereafter to engage only those targets which epposed the Allied forces.

As the landing craft headed toward the island on the last lap of their run, a distant drening heralded the approach of the Flying Fortresces, which were to deliver a final air blow to the harber area before the landing was made. Formation after formation of those heavy benbers came on, each compact and approximately equidistant. During the most 10 or 12 minutes, the men watching from the ships witnessed, at close hand, a series of precision bembings of great intensity. Turning in over their targets, the B-17's showered tons of bembs upon the island. These struck, causing almost simultaneous flashes and a great roar. Suddenly the whole harber area appeared to rise and hang in mid-air, while smoke and dust hillowed high, dwarfing Montagna Grande, Pantelleria's tallest peak.

Reports of heavy air attacks had reached the Allied forces in North Africa. In fact, from miles away at sea, they were said to have heard, on occasion, the faint rumble of such bombings and to have seen clouds streaked with brown dust drifting across the Mediterranean. The effect of this last staggering blow was, however, so terrific that a mement of silence seemed to follow. Then, with amazing accuracy, the bombers, laying down a kind of creeping barrage, shifted their aim a short distance inland while the warships, preceded by a group of mine sweepers, maneuvered into positions suitable for continuing the bombardment and covering the final landings.

Soon after 1130 hours, the destroyer Mubian, which had come close to the shore, reported that a white flag was flying from the Sant Elmo semaphore station, which was silhouetted against the sky, on the summit of the first

^{*}It was the <u>Laforey</u> according to CinCMED, "The Occupation of Pantelleria . . . ," Incl. 2, par. 19.

mountain ridge, 161 Manifold Airmon on a mission to the island also had seen the white flag flying from the top of "Semaphere Hill." Word was flashed to headquarters is madiately, whereupon a photographic plane was dispatched to take pictures and to confirm the report.

About 1155 hours the naval bembardment stopped, as the first assault craft reached the three beaches in the harber area. Flares seen showed that the men were safely ashere and, within a short time, the waiting ships were infermed that the assault wave had not with little resistance. 163 With the precision of a well-rehearsed play, other landing craft them moved fermed to disgerge their treeps, and seen scores of soldiers were rushing down the ramps, to the skirl of bagpipes of a Highland regiment. 104 Had the landing been opposed, it was planned that the Strategic Air Force would expersive in close coordination with the ground treeps. Actually, opposition was confined largely to one beach, where small-arms fire was silenced quickly. By 1220 hours, the 3d Infantry Brigade had advanced ever the ruins of the term to seise its first objective, a bridgehead extending approximately one-half mile in the harbor area. By the time the 2d Brigade arrived in support, all opposition had ceased.

Shortly after moon, a message forwarded from Malta brought the information that Adm. Ginc Pavesi, the military governor of Pantelleria, had asked to surrender, on the ground of a shortage of water. It was afterwards learned that he had signaled Rome for permission to take this step before he knew that an invasion was impending. Upon receipt of the offer of capitulation, further bombing missions were canceled, although fighter

cover over the island was maintained and occasional sweeps continued throughout the remainder of the day. 107 Soon after 1330 heurs, General Clutterbuck and his staff went ashere, where they found that many of the Italian garrison had already been taken into custody. 108 In the meantime additional troops had arrived, and the unleading of stores and equipment had proceeded at such a pace that, within a few hours, tanks were placed at the disposal of the British 1st Division. 109 In approaching Pantelleria, some of the later assault craft had been threatened by fighter-bombers from Sicily, but Allied aircraft soon routed the German planes, forcing them to jettison their bombs haphasardly, without causing much damage. In midafternoon, enemy aircraft again attempted to strike at the convey and to raid the island, but were driven off by Allied fighter planes circling in the vicinity. Within the next few hours the strength of the attack upon ships in the harbor dwindled under the vigor of Allied opposition. 110


Upon landing on the island it had not been possible for Allied officers to get into immediate touch with any responsible Italian authority, as the intensity of the recent bombing had led Admiral Pavesi and his headquarters to seek refuge in the hills. After the military governor had been located late in the afternoon, a conference was held in the "underground" hangar for the discussion of terms and the signing of papers of surrender. With the conclusion of this ceremony at 1735 hours, the formal capitulation of Pantelleria was accomplished.

The impossibility of making a systematic teur of the island in any but a tracked vehicle gave some indication of the amount of destruction caused by the Allied assault. In the harbor area there appeared to be scarcely a square yard that did not show signs either of bombing or of shelling. An assessment of the extent of damage was to be undertaken immediately by a group of scientific experts already on the ground, but it would be some days before the results of their appraisal would be known. Meanwhile the task of evacuating more than 11,000 prisoners of war was begun. 113 and prompt measures were taken to prepare Pantelleria for the part that it was to play in the invasion of Sicily. The transfermation of the island into a major air base for use in this operation represented a sizable undertaking which, of necessity, had to be accomplished within a short time. The town was in ruins; many reads were impassable; communications were disrupted; the harbor was cluttered with wreckage; and the airfield was covered with craters. In Allied hands, the island was new subject to attack by enemy planes, and ships plying between Pantelleria and the North African coast ran the risk of an encounter with enemy craft. despite the vigilance of Allied patrels. 114 Yet, in the face of all difficulties, the work of conversion progressed with surprising rapidity.

The care with which plans for the centrel and maintenance of Pantelleria had been drawn accounted, in part, for the success of the program. 115

According to arrangements made well in advance, the army garrison was to be furnished by the British. 16 Yet because of the use of the island primarily as an air base, General Spaats had been instructed by General Eisenhower to nominate an officer whe, as commander, would be directly responsible to him. His choice fell upon Brig. Gen. Auby C. Strickland, then associated with the Ninth Air Force. 117 Consequently it was he whe, as military governer, assumed control from Major General Clutterbuck on

17 June, less than a week after the island had been secured. Under him functioned the 2690th Air Base Command (Prov.), a special unit of the III Air Force Service Command created at the end of May for duty en Pantelleria. Moving to the island en the heels of the ground troops, this organisation immediately applied itself to the task of cleaning up and making Pantelleria tenable for tactical aircraft, With the accomplishment of this undertaking, the Allies would be assured of an additional base from which they could operate in the coming invasion of Sicily. So effective were the effects of the 2690th that, by 26 June, it was possible to establish on the island the 33d Fighter Group, which had been engaged, since D-day, in patrolling Pantelleria and in protecting shipping. In the early merning of 10 July, approximately a month after the surrender of the island, P-40's of this unit took off from the Pantellerian airfield to patrol theSicilian beaches at Licata, over which treops of the United States 3d Infantry Division were then streaming. 120



Chapter III

THE TAKING OF LAMPHONA, LINCOL, AND LAMPIONE

The loss of Pantelleria aleas would not have deprived Italy of her foothold in the Sicilian narrows, for she would still have held the islands of Lampedusa, Linesa, and Lampiene, a group known as the Isele Pelagie. Lampedusa, the largest and southermost of the three, is situated about 85 miles southeast of Pantelleria and almost 100 miles east of Cap Afrique, the nearest point on the Tunisian coast. In shape, the island is roughly an elengated triangle, measuring seven miles from east to west and two and a quarter miles from north to south, with its apex to the west. With an area of approximately 20 square miles, its size is slightly less than half that of Pantelleria. Unlike, Pantelleria, Lampedusa is not velcanic in origin, but consists of a limestone plateau tipped with sandstone, which attains a maximum height of seme 400 feet in the rolling country of Mente Albere Sele, to the northwest. Its lowest point is found in the southeastern corner of the island, near the airfield, where the elevation averages 50 feet.

In general, the coast is high and rugged. On the east and south, however, the cliffs become lower, and are broken by a series of steep-walled valleys that run down to the sea, forming long, narrow inlets. One of these, opening out into a three-pronged bay, provides the island with its single harbor, an anchorage available to small vessels only. In this area are located the port and town of Lampedusa, the center of population in a community supported largely by agriculture and fishing.

Fig. 1. Service separate of restating an investon. In earlier mention it is the following the every set a subscript mass and as a temporary landing ground further planes that grayed upon shipping, or were sugaged in flights senses the Mediterranean. However, through bembings by air-ereft from Malta, these bases were thought to have been hadly crippled several matchs earlier.

As an Italian strenghold, Lampednes, although garrisoned, had never approached Pantelleria in importance. In recent weeks, its value to the enemy had been considerably decreased by the passing of the whole of the North African coast into Allied hands. By the middle of May, when final arrangements for the Pantellerian offensive were being concluded, General Risenhower had therefore decided that no plans for a combined operation against Lampedness should be made. Yet continued possession of the island by Italy was most undesirable, especially since it was the site of a strong RDF station. If, then, opportunity for its capture should arise, (naval) he determined that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean should have charge of the undertaking. In such an event Admiral Cunningham, the holder of that command, would call upon the other services for necessary assistance.

By way of preparation for any such possibility, numerous photographic reconnaissance missions were flown over Lampedusa, and information concerning the island was gathered from other sources. Meanwhile, need for the destruction of its powerful RDF station, located on the north shore near Mente Albero Sole, led to a commando raid on the night of 6/7 June.

Despite the height of the cliffs at this point, a possible landing place was reported to lie almost due south of the station, with an exit to higher ground up the bed of a narrow, rocky ravine. In the course of the night, two MTB and assault craft carrying about 30 men succeeded in approaching the island, apparently without detection. When the landing was about to be made, mortar and small-arms fire was opened upon the assault craft.

As a consequence, the effort was abandoned—with two men reported missing. During the withdrawal, the MTB were illumined by searchlight and engaged with fair accuracy by two batteries. A few days later broadcasts from Rome and Berlin announced that, on the night of the 7th, a second effort to take Lampedusa had been made, but that this attempt, like the previous one, had been strongly repulsed.

On 11 June, an opportune time for the seizure of the island presented itself when, shortly before noon, word was received at General Eisenhower's headquarters that tokens for the surrender of Pantelleria had been seen from the air. Under such circumstances, it was probable that most of the air cover provided for the landing would not be needed. Orders therefore were issued for the shifting of the air attack to Lampedusa, as seen as the "all clear" came from the command ship. Scarcely more than an hour after this signal had been given, 24 B-26's from the Northwest African Strategic Air Ferce were on their way to drop 17-1/2 tens of bombs on the island—an attack which denoted the beginning of a systematic effort to destroy its defenses in the area of the port and the town.

In the meantime, Rear Adm. C.H.J. Marcourt, the Commander of Force

L, had been instructed to divert all available naval forces from Pantelleria

to Lampedusa and to bombard the island day and night with such intensity

as was necessary. In the late afternoon of the 11th, when it had become apparent that the capitulation of Pantelleria would be accomplished without further resistance, a task force consisting of H. M. cruisers Newfoundland, Aurora, Orion, and Penelope, and six destroyers sailed. With them, in shlCI, went one company of the Coldstream Guards, then a part of the floating reserve lying off Pantelleria. It was understood that this unit would not be required to make an assault landing, but would occupy the islands and deal with prisoners of war, in case of a surrender.

How great an effort would be needed for the reduction of Lampedusa could not be determined. From the information available, there was reason to believe that Italian engineers had employed their skill to advantage in supplementing the natural defenses of the island. Since approximately half of the coast was girted by cliffs from 150 to 400 feet high, there were long stretches where apparently it had not been considered necessary to build more than an occasional observation post to keep watch over the approaches from the sea. On the north shore, two exceptions were found. The RDF station and semaphore tower were strongly protected, and widerange guns swept the waters of two bays lying some distance to the east. Inasmuch as the remainder of the coast was marked by deep indentations. the Italians had fortified many of the little promontories with coastal defense and antiaircraft guns that were mutually supporting. Moreover. the heads of the inlets at which landings might be effected were covered by fire from casemates set well back from the shore. In the neighborhood of the port, where the cliffs dropped vertically into the sea, emplacements had been fixed in the face of the rock and connected with galleries leading learned that all these defence positions were linked by the selection of communications controlled from a controlled from a controlled from the basis of intelligence reports, it was people that the selection and the island. Although nothing was known about the merale of these troops, it was to be expensed that they would offer some opposition—especially in the initial stages of the attack.

The bombardment of Lampednes, begun by the B-26's of the Morthwest African Strategic Air Force, was carried on throughout the afternoon of ll June by aircraft of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force. The brunt of the attack was borne by B-25's. A-20's, and A-36's, which were used extensively and to good advantage in this operation. The principal targets consisted of term and harbor installations and gun positions in the surrounding area. In some cases, the antiaircraft fire with which the enemy countered these attacks was fairly accurate, and, as a result, a few planes were damaged by flak. In the course of the night RAF Wellingtons continued the effensive, causing heavy damage in the target area and starting fires that were visible for 40 miles. 16 This raid. coming shortly before midnight, was made in conjunction with the first of a series of bombardments by the four cruisers and six destroyers that had been diverted from Pantelleria. Despite the strength of the assault, there was no apparent reaction on the part of the enemy. Two hours later, the Penelope and the Newfoundland fired 10 rounds per gun. again without calling forth any attempt at retaliation. Further bombardment by all

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With resumption of the air effencive at 6900 hours on the 12th a procession of Mitchells and Maranders, Bostons and Baltimores, Mustangs, Lightnings, and Warhanks began to sweep in relays across the island. If the whole, little opposition was encountered. The antiaircraft resistance experienced on the provious afternoon had almost disappeared, and the few long-range enemy fighters that were seen by aircraft of the MASAF promptly fled at the approach of the bembers. By late afternoon, it was estimated that 450 sorties had been flown, and that several hundred tens of bombs had been dropped. This heavy bembardment had resulted in damage to gun emplacements, the disabling of a radio station, and the wrecking of approximately a third of the term. In the harbor small craft along with one larger beat had been struck, and columns of smoke were visible on every hand.

Despite this destruction and the flying of four nickeling missions over the airfield and town, no signs of surrender were sighted until approximately 1730 hours. At that time, pilets of the 27th Bombardment Group rising from a bomb run in the target area observed a white cross being painted on the airdreme. It was not, however, until the island had been subjected to further bombardment from air and sea that a white flag was seen flying at one of the entrances to the harbor. Upon receipt

began to make preparations for a landing. According to pepular account, the islanders' willingness to surrender had already been conveyed to the Allies by an RAF pilot on a sea-rescue sweep out of Malta. Finding his supply of gasoline running low, he had landed, in one of the intervals between bombings, on the Lampedusan airfield, where, to his surprise, he was greeted by members of the garrison waving white flags and wishing to deliver the island to him. Caught almost immediately by the next raid, he had been obliged to seek shelter, along with the Italians. However, at the end of the attack he had succeeded in having his Walrus biplane refueled, and straightway returned to his base with the news.

About 1900 hours, when a number of white flags had appeared on the island, the naval commander sent an officer ashere to accept the surrender. In three quarters of an hour negotiations had been completed. The 60 Coldstream Guards then landed, to cope with the problems presented by some 3,000 civilians and more than 4,000 prisoners of war. The situation was one that could not be met satisfactorily by a landing party of small size. In violation of the terms of surrender, soldiers were blowing up their equipment. The few Germans on the island were visiting the RDF installations, in an effort to destroy their secret apparatus. In the confusion, civilians had seized the opportunity to lost military food supplies. A request for reinforcements was made at once, but until their arrival, guards from the eccupational force were detailed to food, fuel, and ammunition stores, which were pointed out to them by the Italians.

morning of 13 June when, with due ceremony, the Union Jack was raised over the residence of the military governor of Lampedusa. 29 With the coming of reinforcements at midday on 14 June, order was restored. The Italians then proved most cooperative. Public utilities were soon in operation and, within a few days, the airfield had been put into such condition that it could be used with care. 30

Meanwhile, in compliance with orders received from Admiral Cunningham, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the Newfoundland, in company with the destroyers Nubian and Troubridge, sailed for Linosa, 28 miles to the northeast. Soon after daylight on the morning of the 13th, this tiny island of approximately four square miles was captured without any effort. Having learned of the fate of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, the local commander had decided to offer no resistance. Upon approaching the island, the three ships therefore found a white flag fleating from the signal tower. A small force was thereupon dispatched from the Nubian to take off the garrison of 140 soldiers and sailors and to destroy military stores and equipment.

While these orders were being carried out, the Newfoundland and the Troubridge proceeded to Lampiene, a tiny lighthouse island eight miles northwest of Lampedusa. At the time of their arrival the weather was not suitable for landing, so that it was not until the next day (14 June) that a naval party from the Troubridge could be set ashore. Their surmise that the island was uninhabited proved to be correct. Unwilling to wait for the eppertunity to surrender, the lighthouse-keeper had already departed. With the taking of Lampiene, the last of the Pelagian Islanda had fallen to the Allies. The way for the invasion of Sicily was now cleared.

Chapter IV

AN APPRAISAL

The capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa marked the completion of the first of what Mr. Churchill, in an address to Parliament a few days before, had alluded to as "amphibious operations of a peculiar complexity and hazard." The neutralization of these Italian outposts, coupled with the victory in Tunisia, now enabled the Allies to place a complete air umbrella over the Sicilian narrows. Although full command of the channel could be gained only with the occupation of Sicily, the position of the Allies in the Mediterranean had been strengthened by their increased control over this stretch of water. For many months the sending of supplies from the United Kingdom to Malta had proved a major naval operation, in which substantial losses had to be reckoned. On 29 May, however, an official report carried news of the safe passage of two eastbound convoys through the Sicilian channel, and three weeks later it was announced officially that a westbound convoy had safely traversed the Mediterranean. 3 Although the menace from Axis aircraft was not entirely removed, there was strong probability that enemy air forces would soon be concerned almost exclusively with the problem of defense, as Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian mainland felt the weight of the Allied attack. The greater security of the Mediterranean route now brought Alexandria within a little more than 3,000 miles of England. In comparison with the 12,000-mile trip around the Cape of Good Hope, which the Allies had been obliged to make after the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940, this represented an immense saving both in time and in shipping tonnage.

The surrender of the Italian-held islands had furnished a spectacular illustration of the intense and violent force that the Allies could bring to bear upon the enemy. In large measure, that force had been provided by air power. The Royal Navy, to be sure, had made a valuable contribution in isolating the islands and in silencing individual batteries and strong-points, but it was the saturation bombing by the Northwest African Air Forces which had wrought general havec among the defenses and broken the enemy's will to oppose an invasion. The reduction of the islands furnished the first proof of the power of such bombardment to induce surrender. The only comparable instance was the capture of Crete by the Germans. The two engagements differed, however, in that the fall of Crete had resulted from success in coordinating aerial bombardment with the operations of troops that had been landed by parachute, glider, and transport plane. In the case of Pantelleria and Lampedusa the situation was reversed. The actual task of conquest had been accomplished largely by air units having the tactical role of long-range artillery, so that it was not until resistance had been crushed that assault troops had moved forward to occupy the islands. By that time, the enemy had already indicated his willingness to surrender.

Owing to the uniqueness of this achievement, there was a popular tendency to regard the capitulation of Pantelleria and Lampedusa as a landmark in the history of aerial warfare. In fact, the feat was hailed by some enthusiasts as proof that no force could stand up under the prolonged and concentrated bombardment of properly selected targets—a thesis that had been, and still was, considered extremely controversial.

On the basis of the CORKSCREW operation, such a contention was not necessarily conclusive. If it was the enemy's intention to hold Pantelleria, he had, until alate day, grossly underestimated the strength of the air and sea bombardment that could be directed against the island. Had he possessed greater foresight and constructed his defenses accordingly, the taking of the island might have been a formidable task. As it was, reliance was placed upon batteries and pillboxes that were poorly protected and without camouflage. There were no shelters for crews or ammunition adjacent to the guns. Wire was used sparingly and to little advantage on the beaches; no dummies, land mines, booby traps, or underwater obstacles were employed; and all intercommunication lines were laid above ground, so that, when these became unserviceable, sectional staffs remained in touch with the island commander by radio (R/T) only.

Even under the circumstances it was thought that, in the face of a resolute defense, the reduction of Pantelleria might have been accomplished only with difficulty. The negligible casualties which the enemy had suffered—150 to 200 killed and 200 wounded—seemed to indicate a reluctance on his part to run undue risks. In fact, these figures were interpreted to mean that the battery crews had failed to remain at their posts, and that the civilian population had taken to cover or had fled to relatively safe territory in the central and southern portions of the island—a supposition later substantiated by the interrogation of prisoners of war. In the opinion of a small group of captured Luftwaffe technicians, a company of German soldiers would have made a better showing than had the insular garrison of more than 11,000 men. It was their conviction that,

if the military personnel had consisted entirely of Germans, the island would not have been captured, for, against antiaircraft manned by German gunners, they were sure that the operations of Allied bombers would have been less successful.

Politically a part of the Trapani Province of Sicily, Pantelleria belonged to metropolitan Italy and was more genuinely Italian soil than any section of Libya. As a consequence, its fall after so brief a campaign provoked a good deal of comment. Malta, by contrast, had not only survived three years of bombardment but had defended itself to such purpose that its squadrons were able to participate in the current Allied offensive. Whether men of tougher fiber would have found it possible to offer more effective resistance was a debatable question. In all fairness, there was something to be said on behalf of the Italians. Even in its darkest days Malta had possessed air protection, which Pantelleria had not had. Moreover, enemy assaults upon Malta were sporadic and marked by relatively inaccurate bombing, while the Allied attack upon Pantelleria was heavy and continuous, with hits on military targets made with mathematical precision. In Professor Zuckerman's estimation, the people of few areas had been obliged to endure bombing of such intensity as that to which the batteries were subjected in the course of the campaign-an average of 1.000 tons per square mile. 12 More effective than the sheer weight of bombs dropped were the continuity and increasing scale of attack, according to statements made by prisoners of war. Many of the captured Germans therefore doubted whether even determined men could have manned light defenses and prevented the assault forces from coming

Allies. 13 The withdrawal of all but 78 of the 600 men whom the Germans had had stationed on the island at the close of the Tunisian campaign indicated that they already had discounted the loss of the island.

A survey of Pantelleria after its surrender confirmed the reports that great destruction had resulted from the bombing. 15 The harbor docks at Porto di Pantelleria were severely damaged and the town was a shambles; the communication system had been disrupted; the roads were obstructed by debris and, at some points, almost obliterated. electric power plant had been destroyed, and its distributing lines to important installations, such as pumps, were broken in many places. So, too, were the water mains. As a consequence, the two principal wells of the town had been rendered useless in the early days of the offensive. 16 Despite the claim that lack of water had occasioned the surrender, it developed that there was on the island a sufficient supply--albeit of rather poor quality -- to meet the requirements both of military personnel and civilian population, provided means of transportation could have been found. A similar situation existed in regard to food, for the principal stores had been lost in the general destruction of Porto di Pantelleria. The island, however, would not have been without provisions if facilities for its distribution had been available. 17

At the Margana airdrome, the airfield was badly cratered by bombs. Except for one Me-109 and one Re-2001, all of the 80-odd enemy aircraft abandoned on the island were either destroyed or damaged. Almost 90 per cent of these planes were Italian, with fighters in preponderance. Of

the total number, however, only a few were found in the hangar, while the remainder were scattered along the perimeter of the landing ground. The majority of these were burned, for in most cases they had been damaged or destroyed in the initial stages of the bombing. Some of the aircraft were in process of being crated—an indication that they were intended for salvage. ** From the evidence available, it was concluded that all serviceable aircraft had been evacuated earlier. Most of these planes probably had belonged to the Regia Aeronautica, for it appeared from statements of prisoners of war that no Luftwaffe squadrons had been based on Pantelleria. **19

On the other hand, the so-called underground hangar, which proved to be a structure of steel and concrete built into a rocky hillside and protected by a thick blanket of lava and earth, had withstood a number of direct hits. 20 The damage to the interior was slight, and consequently its power plant and electric cranes were left in good condition. Its workshops, which had been adequate to provide satisfactory maintenance for German and Italian planes, were still intact; the large expanse of floor space available would have made it possible to house a number of aircraft under its roof. A fair amount of aircraft accessories and supplies as well as about 60 airplane engines were also on hand. Surprisingly enough, these had not been stored in the hangar but in the open, under some sort of shelter that had been struck in the course of the bombings. along with the airfield, barracks, and other buildings on the island. The enemy had not suffered from a scarcity of bombs or ammunition, for large quantities of both were found in some of the galleries that had been tunneled into the hill opposite the main hangar. Many of the larger bombs bore the date 1941 and were marked with legends facetiously dedicating them to the destruction of prominent Allied leaders. 21

Despite the weight of the bombardment to which Pantelleria had been subjected, comparatively few of the coastal defense and antiaircraft batteries were damaged sufficiently to prevent their being fired by determined crews, according to the report of British observers who visited the various gun positions soon after the capture of the island. Owing to the fact that clouds of dust and smoke often obscured the targets for 15 or 20 minutes and made aiming difficult, the accuracy of the heavy and medium bombers had been less than that estimated on the basis of their previous performance against other stationary targets. Against a figure of 10 per cent assumed for purposes of the operation, scarcely more than 3.3 per cent of the bombs dropped by B-17's fell within a 100-yard radius of the battery, on an average. The corresponding figure for the medium bombers was approximately 6.4 per cent, and that for the light and fighter-bombers about 2.6 per cent. As a result of this lower accuracy. the bombing destroyed only about half the number of guns expected. Since the island was found to consist of old lava and volcanic ash rather than of the rocklike lava expected, the use of bombs with delayed-action fuzes resulted, in this comparatively soft surface, in the formation of craters but in relatively little horizontal splintering. Consequently, the ratio of indirect to direct damage proved to be four to one instead of two to one as had been expected. Gun platforms were upheaved, electrical connections severed, and many guns that could have been called serviceable were so covered with debris that one or two hours would have been needed for clearance. Because of the disrupted character of the terrain, the maintenance of an ammunition supply would have been a difficult matter. as merely walking from gun to gun required considerable effort. 23

Although the material damage to the guns was slight, it was thought that the bombing attacks had produced a profound effect psychologically. No battery was provided with adequate shelter for detachments or ammunition-a state of affairs that led the crews to abandon their positions and to seek cover at various distances. In fact, none of the batteries which had sustained heavy bombing opened fire on shipping during the landing. On only one of the beaches was there even desultory small-arms fire as the boats came in. A more resolute enemy might have found time. in the interval between the end of the heavy bombing at 1145 hours and the landing at noon, to have manned machine-gun and light-antiaircraft posts, possibly with serious results to the boats. Had it not been for the point-blank fire of the gunboats, destroyers, and supporting craft. which kept the defenders almost wholly underground during this period. it is not unlikely that even the Italians might have offered resistance. However, the intact condition of the hangar and bomb stores was evidence that the garrison was badly shaken by the ordeal of the previous few weeks. With the obvious intent of blowing up all facilities, 1,000-lb. bombs had been placed at strategic points-one, for instance, in the middle of the generating plant, others in the passageways and galleries. Well-distributed charges could also have detonated the hundreds of tons of high explosives in the bomb-store tunnels. For some reason, this work failed to be carried out.24

The demoralizing effects of the bombing both on military and civilian population gave rise to a fairly widespread view that the capitulation of Pantelleria was due almost entirely to the collapse of a poor-spirited garrison, and very little to the destruction of fixed defenses. In

determining the extent of damage inflicted upon the gun positions by
the bombing, no definite values were attached to the destruction of
control posts, and communications, and to the demolition of scientific
equipment and ammunition stores. It was expected, however, that such
damage might prove critical—and apparently it did. Moreover, no
definite allowance was made for guns becoming inoperative through use
or the need for repairs. These additional factors provided sufficient
reason for the silencing of the batteries, in spite of the small number
of guns that were damaged directly. Under the circumstances, it is
doubtful whether even a spirited garrison could have offered serious
opposition to the assault. Had the defenders remained at their posts,
it was estimated from the potential casualty risk of all but a few
lightly attacked batteries that at least 50 per cent of the men would
have been killed or seriously wounded in the course of the bombardment.

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From the experimental character of the Pantellerian offensive, it was to be expected that many lessons would be learned in the course of the operation. Some of these pertained to the development of a better system of communications, the avoidance of premature crossings of the bomb line by invading troops, the avoidance of premature crossings of the bomb line by invading troops, more comprehensive briefing, coordination of intelligence in the three arms of the combined force, and the importance of aerial photography in such an operation. One of the interesting features brought out in connection with the assessment of bomb damage was the rapidity with which photographic readings, made under operational conditions, could be compared, upon landing, with visual inspection on the ground—a check that provided evidence of any differences between interpretation and fact.

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Inasmuch as the purpose of the attack upon Pantelleria lay in rendering the island militarily helpless for a given period, the chief lesson to be derived from the operation had to do with bombing data. From the experience gained, it was evident that, even with the huge quantity of bombs dropped against gun emplacements, only a few direct hits were obtained. There were, however, many near misses, which resulted in different degrees of damage. Those within 5 to 10 yards of the target were usually effective in neutralizing the gun positions, but those beyond that distance apparently had little effect upon the guns themselves. Of the 112 or more gun sites examined after the occupation of the island, 53 appeared to have been neutralized by air bombardment. Of the total number, only 2 had suffered from direct hits; 17 had been lifted from their foundations by near misses; and 34 had been damaged by debris and splinters.

In attacks upon the airdrome, the 20-lb. fragmentation bomb was especially effective in damaging aircraft on the landing field and in antipersonnel attacks against gun crews. Since neutralization of the airdrome was effected by 24 May, the density of bombs directed against this target has little significance. In the case of the U.S. 1,000-lb. and 500-lb. general-purpose bombs, which were used in almost equal quantities, it proved impossible to differentiate between the effects of the two, owing to the continuity of craters and high bomb density. There was, however, evidence that, for the attacks on batteries, the effective radius of the 1,000-lb. bomb was only about one and a half times that of the 500-lb. bomb. In view of the difficulty in making direct hits on such small

targets as gun positions, there seemed to be an advantage in using the 500-lb. size, since the probability of hits and near misses was decidedly increased by reason of the larger number of bombs employed. Equally significant was the fact that, with the short train normally used, the number of probable hits increased directly with the total length of the train. 32

On the basis of the Pantellerian experiment, it appeared that, in attacks on fixed defenses, bombs fuzed with a delay of .025 seconds gave better results than bombs fuzed instantaneously. Although this fuzing restricted aplintering, it produced craters and thus provided a better chance for damage from debris -- a consideration especially important in the case of modern guns, which have many more delicate electrical instruments exposed than did most of the guns on Pantelleria. It also permitted the operation of ground shock and proved to be good fuzing against buildings such as control posts and workshops, which were shown to be targets well worth attacking. 33 The difference in the effects of the two types was well illustrated by the attacks upon Battery No. 1. which guarded the entrance to the harbor of Porto di Pantelleria on the east, and Battery No. 4A, which was located below the port, on the west coast. More than twice the number and total tonnage of bombs was directed at No. 4A as at No. 1 (432 tons as opposed to 189.5. and 949 bombs as opposed to 414). The majority, if not all, of the bombs that burst in the area of Battery No. 1 penetrated before exploding, and so made craters. On the other hand, almost all those that burst in the vicinity of Battery No. 4A exploded on the surface of the hard rock. In the case of No. 1, practically all the damage was caused by debris;

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in that of No. 4A, all damage was due to splinters. In Battery No. 1, one gun was made completely useless, and four others were so heavily damaged that 83.25 x 10 man-hours were considered necessary for repairs. In Battery No. 4A, the damage amounted to one gun rendered completely useless and an estimated time of 120.7 x 10 man-hours required for repairs. A comparison of these sets of figures shows that almost as much damage was done in No. 1 as in No. 4A, with less than half the weight of bombs. In the former instance the fuzing was .025 delayed; in the latter, instantaneous. 34

From these results, it followed that a careful study of the character of the terrain and soil in the target areas, and of the most effective type of bomb to be used, must be made for each bombing task. In the absence of wind, which would blow away smoke and dust occasioned by a bombing attack, especially in territory of volcanic origin, continuous heavy-fire precision bombing was not considered practical. Under such weather conditions, a considerable interval must elapse between sorties, in order to permit accurate observation. 35

Of the efficacy of fighter-bomber attacks against gun positions, there was little evidence in the Pantellerian operation. Because of the inability of ground forces to cope with efforts of this kind, these planes were able to make low-altitude runs over the target and to bomb with an accuracy which compared favorably with that of medium and heavy bombers. From the reports received, there appeared to be slight support for the contention that strafing had more than a temporary value in intimidating gun crews while the attack was actually in progress. As a consequence,

 $\frac{\partial \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right)}{\left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{2}$

it was recommended that alternate forms of precision attack be employed in such instances. Under conditions of air superiority, the use of B-25's with 75-mm. guns or rocket-equipped aircraft were suggested as a possibility. 36

As a test of the virtue of air power, the Pantellerian offensive had proved a gratifying experiment—and one that had made a deep impression in neutral countries like Turkey—for it represented the first Allied move toward the invasion of the Continent.³⁷ Yet, because of the comparatively easy success of the operation, it furnished inadequate criterion for estimating the outcome of future efforts of this kind. The capture of other Mediterranean islands that served as steppingstones to Europe obviously presented greater difficulties from the standpoint of size and the character of their terrain. Their garrisons were more strongly staffed, and the targets which they offered for air bombardment were more widely scattered.

The reduction of Pantelleria, however, had been carried out in accordance with a well-developed plan that gave indication of the trend of Allied strategy. This was a fact of considerable importance, in that the pattern set here was probably one that would be followed in other island operations, and perhaps in the invasion of the Continent itself. There would be an intensive period of air attack, constantly increasing in tempo and supplemented by naval bombardment, before any surface operations would be launched. Such a scheme provides for the economical use of combat men but requires time. It also is extremely costly in supplies such as gasoline, bombs, air crews, planes, and the vast organization needed to keep them in operation. In the case of Pantelleria and Lampedusa,

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it was believed that the insignificant losses incurred in the taking of the islands more than justified these expenditures. 38

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AA Antiaircraft A/C Aircraft AFABI Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence AFAEP Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department C-in-C Commander-in-Chief F/Lt Flight Lieutenant GAF German Air Force GCI/COL Ground control interception/chain overseas low GO General Order HQ Headquarters IAF Italian Air Force L.A.A. Reg. Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (British) LCI Landing craft, infantry Landing craft, tank LCT General report of operations (weekly) LINREP LST Landing ship, tank MAC Mediterranean Air Command MAS Motoscafi Anti-Sommergibili (German and Italian craft corresponding to United States MTB) ETM Motor torpedo boat OTM Mediterranean Theater of Operations NAAF Northwest African Air Forces NACAF Northwest African Coastal Air Force NAPRI Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing NASAF Northwest African Strategic Air Force nataf Northwest African Tactical Air Force Office of Naval Intelligence O.N.I. OPSUMS Operational summaries Patrol torpedo boat **HAF** Royal Air Force ..DF Radio direction finder Hoyal Engineers t.E. R.E.M.E. Royal Engineers, Middle East R/T Kadio telephone or radio telephony 5... South African SAME South African Air rorce SAF Strategic Air Force S/E Single engine SITREP Situation Report (daily) TAF Tactical Air Force TBF Tactical Bomber Force T/E Twin engine USAAF U. 3. Army Air Forces USNR U. S. Naval Reserve

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NOTES

Chapter I

- 1. For an account of the Casablanca Conference, see Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's Report on the Sicilian Operations, in Combat Analysis files, AGO.
- 2. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report on the Pantellerian Operations, dated June 1943. [Hereafter cited as Eisenhower Report.] See also Capt. Harry C. Butcher, U.S.N.R., My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 302. [Hereafter cited as Butcher Diary.]
- 3. Pantelleria lies on the submarine ridge that runs from Tunis to Sicily, dividing the Mediterranean into an eastern and a western basin. Owing to the number of banks on the ridge, the floor of the sea is very irregular. Pantelleria and Linosa, both of volcanic origin, are said to rise out of the channel, while the neighboring limestone islands of Lampedusa and Malta lie on the edges of the shallow platforms bordering the east coast of Tunisia and the southern shore of Sicily. (See "Pantelleria Island Landing Beaches," prepared by the Beach Erosion Board, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, April 1943, Preliminary Report, Strategic Engineering Study No. 66; and Harry S. Washington, "The Volcances and Rocks of Pantelleria," Journal of Geology, XXI, 1913, pp. 653-54.)
- 4. The German Freya RDF is a long-range instrument capable of plotting aircraft within a range of 150 to 160 miles, provided that the planes are flying sufficiently high. A Freya located at 200 feet, with a clear view to the sea can detect an airplane flying above 20,000 feet, at a range of 160 miles. It can "see" a plane flying at 10,000 feet at a range of 120 miles, while one flying at 2,000 feet can be seen at a maximum range of only 55 miles. Although the Freya can make accurate measurements of range and can determine direction fairly well, it is not capable of measuring the altitude of its targets. (Air Intelligence Weekly Summary, No. 41, 21-27 Aug. 1943, pp. 29-30.)
- 5. Eisenhower Report.
- 6. The MAS (Motoscafi Anti-Sommergibili) is an Italian version of the "E" boat, although somewhat smaller, in that its length varies from 60 to 85 feet. A top speed of 42 knots makes it a faster craft than the "E" boat. It is armed with two torpedoes and a Breda or comparable gun. The storage of its fuel in tanks below deck abaft the bridge gives it the same Achilles heel as has the "E" boat. (RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 6 [Jan.-March 1944], pp. 57, 59.)

- 7. Ibid.
- 8. Ibid.
- 9. The phenomenon of "marrobbio" -- a sudden periodic rising and falling of sea level over a range of as much as three feet, within one-half to two hours -- familiar to the Sicilian coast is said to be noted around Pantelleria also. In landing operations, tides in the Mediterranean may be considered as negligible. (Strategic Engineering Study No. 66.)
- 10. <u>Journal of Geology</u>, XXI, p. 654; "Terrain Intelligence, Pantelleria Island," prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey, Feb. 1943 (Special Report, Strategic Engineering Study No. 56); Strategic Engineering Study No. 66.
- ll. Ibid.
- 12. London <u>Times</u>, 12 June 1943; <u>New York Times</u>, 13 June 1943, Editorial Sec.
- 13. For a description of the so-called underground hanger, see n. 20, p.100. See also Strategic Engineering Study No. 56, p. 6; Eisenhower Report.
- 14. Ibid.; New York Times, 6 June 1943, p. 6.
- 15. Eisenhower Report.
- 16. Ibid.
- 17. Butcher Diary, p. 308.
- 18. Eisenhower Report.
- 19. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 20. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 21. <u>Ibid.</u>; Northwest African Tactical Air Force, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," p. 95.
- 22. Eisenhower Report.

Chapter II

- 1. CM-IN-5757 (5-9-43), Algiers to AGWAR, 9 May 43; CM-IN-5895 (5-9-43), Spaatz to Arnold, thru Algiers to AGWAR, 9 May 43; CM-IN-6087 (5-10-43), Algiers to AGWAR, 9 May 43; CM-IN-6856 (5-11-43), Algiers to AGWAR (SITREP #199), 11 May 43. For a daily account of the missions, see Twelfth Air Force, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1942-15 June 1943, and the incoming cables for the period. See also "Prelude to Invasion," RAF Middle EMST Review, No. 3 (April-June 1943), pp. 41-42.
- 2. CM-IN-1214 (5-2-43), Algiers to AGWAR, 2 May 43.
- 3. Early in the morning of 13 May, a cruiser with destroyer escort bombarded the harbor of Pantelleria while seven torpedo boats (TBS) established inshore patrols to intercept enemy vessels which might put out to engage Allied forces. (CM-IN-12556 [5-20-43], Eisenhower to AGWAR, 18 May 43.) For the maintenance of a blockade of the Cap Bon Peninsula and other attacks on Pantelleria harbor, see CM-IN-10541 (5-16-43), Algiers to AGWAR, #1546, 15 May 43.
- 4. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, pp. 41-42.
- 5. Eisenhower Report.
- 6. At this time the NASAF and the NATAF are reported to have had 1,017 aircraft between them. This number included:

| Strategic | Tactical | Total |
|-----------|---|---|
| 122 | - | 122 |
| 84 | 18 | 102 |
| 64 | | 64 |
| 24 | | 24 |
| · | 54. | 54 |
| 197 | | 197 |
| • | 78 | 123 |
| 77 | - | 77 |
| ~ | 254 | 254 |
| 613 | 404 | 1,017 |
| | 122 84 64 24 - 197 45 77 | 122 — 84 18 64 — 24 — 54 197 — 45 78 77 — 254 |

7. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, p. 41.

8. The enemy air strength within range of Pantelleria was distributed as follows:

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280 S/E fighters on Sicily and Sardinia
60 T/E fighters on Sicily and Sardinia
130 Ju-88's
70 Light bombers
200 S/E fighters (Ital.) "toe" of Italy
110 Medium bombers (Ital.)
30 S/E fighters (Ital.) on Pantelleria
54 Bombers (Ital.)
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(See "Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," pars. 6-7, prepared by NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., in History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 3.)

- 9. "Twelfth Air Force in the Sicilian Campaign," Pt. II, Pantellerian Operations, par. 16; see also Operational Chart, this study.
- 10. The American units of the NASAF were organized as follows:

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5th Wing
                      2d Bomb Group
                     97th Bomb Group
                                          B-17's
                     99th Bomb Group
                    301st Bomb Group
                      1st Fighter Group P-38's
                      14th Fighter Group
47th Wing
                    310th Bomb Group
                                          B-25's
                    321st Bomb Group )
                     82d Fighter Group
                                          P-38's
2686 Wing (Prov.)
                     17th Bomb Group
                     319th Bomb Group (320th Bomb Group )
                                          B-26's
                     325th Fighter Group P-40's
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(Ibid.)

11. The 2686th Medium Bombardment Wing (Prov.) was activated on 6 June 1943, at Sedrata, Algeria (pursuant to Hq. NASAF, GO 12, 6 June 1943, Sec. I). On 1 September 1943, all American units assigned to the Northwest African Strategic Air Force reverted to the control of the XII Bomber Command. (Hq. NAAF, GO 166, 26 August 1943.) As a consequence, the unit was disbanded at Ariana, Tunisia, on 3 September 1943. (Hq. XII Bomber Comd., GO 6, 3 Sep. 1943. See History, 42d Bombardment Wing (Medium), June 1943-November 1944, App. A.) The 42d Bombardment Wing (Medium) actually was the successor to the 2686th Wing.

- 12. "Twelfth Air Force in the Sicilian Campaign," Pt. II, par. 16;
 NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria." For information concerning No. 242 Group (RAF), see Mare Nostrum, No. 52,
 14 Sep. 1944, p. 5. This issue gives an account of the operations of the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force from March 1943 to September 1944.
- 13. After the close of the Tunisian campaign the 57th and 79th Fighter Groups rested in the vicinity of Kairouan from 24 May to 2 June. Then the pilots, aircraft, and some chosen ground personnel moved to El Haouaria. Their participation in the Pantellerian campaign began on 4 June. Although attached to the XII Air Support Command for operational purposes, their official transfer from the Ninth Air Force to that organization did not take place until 22 August 1943. (Hq. NAAF, GO 164, 21 Aug. 1943. See Outline History, 79th Fighter Group, 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1943; see also Administrative History, Ninth Air Force.)
- 14. The 99th Squadron was a Negro fighter unit that had reached the theater in April 1943. After being stationed at Oued N'ja, French Morocco, an advance echelon moved, at the end of May, to the squadrons new landing field at Fardjouna, in the vicinity of Hergla, Tunisia. Here they were joined by the ground echelon in June. In the Pantellerian operation, members of the 99th received their first real combat experience. For initial missions, the squadron was attached to the 33d Fighter Group, which functioned under the XII Air Support Command. From 2 to 9 June, pilots of the 99th Squadron flew an average of two missions a day. Sometimes they bombed gun positions on Pantelleria; at other times they served as escorts for A-20's and B-25's. Their first encounter with enemy aircraft came on the morning of 9 June, while escorting 12 A-20's over Pantelleria. From the airfield below. 4 Me-109's were seen to take off, prior to the bomb run. Immediately thereafter, they attacked the bombers from an altitude of 3,000 feet. While Bostons were accompanied home by P-40's from another unit. four aircraft of the 99th turned upon the enemy, with the result that the Me-109's promptly fled. Despite participation in a series of engagements, the squadron was fortunate to come through the Pantellerian campaign without mishap. (See History of the 99th Fighter Squadron, May-Oct. 1943.) By 14 June, the squadron was reported to have accomplished, to date, 10 fighter-bomber, 2 fightercover, 6 escort, and 2 fighter-sweep missions, totaling 136 sorties. From this limited experience, it was concluded that its training was progressing satisfactorily. (CM-IN-8751 (6-14-43), Spaatz to Arnold, thru Algiers to AGWAR, #JMO 655, 14 June 43.)
- 15. The advance echelon of the 27th Bombardment Group (L) was moved to Korba South, Tunisia, on 2 June 1943. (Outline History, 27th Bomb Gp. (L), 1 June-31 Dec. 1943.) On 6 June, its 16th, 17th, and 91st Souadrons began to fly in the Pantellerian campaign. In order that the pilots of this organization should not be entirely dependent upon maps and photographs for their knowledge of the operational area, these first three missions of the group (one for each squadron) were designed to give them an opportunity to see the island. Their (contd)

| 15. | (Contd) | part | in | the | Pantelleria-Lampedusa | operation | is | shown | in | the |
|-----|-----------|--------|-----|-----|-----------------------|-----------|----|-------|----|-----|
| | following | ng tal | ble | : | - | | | | | |

| Squadrons | Sorties | Bombs Dropped | Planes Destroyed | Planes Prob. Destroyed | Planes Damaged |
|-----------|---------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| 16th Bomb | 126 | 240 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 17th | 108 | 172 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 91st | 134 | 199 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Hq. | 28 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | _ | - | - |
| TOTAL | 396 | 653 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Losses of the 27th Bombardment Group for the period 6-12 June were one plane and one crew in the Pantellerian campaign and the same number in the attack upon Lampedusa. (See 27th Bomb Gp.(L), "Pantelleria and Lampedusa Campaigns, 6-12 June 1943.")

The A-36 was a fighter-bomber converted from the P-51 (Mustang) by the addition of bomb racks and dive brakes. These modifications made it possible for this type of airplane to deliver its bomb load with extreme accuracy. Its speed and maneuverability also made it satisfactory for glide bombing. Employed in this way, the degree of accuracy obtained was much less than that got by using the dive brakes to secure vertical dives on the target. Because of its excellent range, the A-36 could be used to good advantage against strategic pin-point targets. Within a reasonable range, it therefore could complement most effectively the work of the strategic bomber. (For a discussion of the A-36 as a combat plane, see Hq. NAAF, A-3 Sec., Opns. Bulletin, No. 3, 1-30 June 1943, "The Air Effort Against Pantelleria, "pp.18-23.)

16. On 14 May, the XII Air Support Command Headquarters was stationed at Le Sers, Tunisia, and all units of the command were located in that area. Three days later the command moved to Korba, and by 20 May unit squadrons had joined it there, ready to begin the attack against Pantelleria. The order of battle was as follows:

| Organization 1 | No. of Sqs. | Type of A/C | <u>Location</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|
| 31st Fighter Group | 3 | Spitfire | Korba North |
| 33d Fighter Group | 3 | F-40 | Menzel Temine |
| 57th Fighter Group | 3 | P-40 | El Haouaria |
| 79th Fighter Group | 3 | P-40 | El Haouaria |
| 99th Fighter Squadron | 1 | P-40 | Fardjouna [Fortuna] |
| 27th Bombardment | | | |
| Group (L) | 3 | A-36 | Korba South |
| | | | |

| 16. | (Contd) Organization | No. of Sas. | Type of A/C | Location |
|-----|----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | *No. 241 Squadron (Brit.) | 1 | Hurribomber II-C | Ariana |
| | *225 Tact. Rcn. Squadron (Brit.) | 1 1 | Spitfire | Menzel Heurr [Ariana] |

^{*} Before the Sicilian operation, these two units seem to have been attached to the Tactical Bomber Force.

(This list is given in Hq. XII Air Support Command, "Pantellerian Campaign" (14 May-12 June, 1943)," dated 7 Nov. 1943. See also NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," App. A. Instances in which the NATAF report differs from that of the XII Air Support Command are noted in brackets.)

17. Units of the Tactical Bomber Force and their locations were reported as follows:

| Organization | No. of Sqs. | Type of A/C | Location |
|---|--|----------------------------|---|
| 47th Bomb Group 12th Bomb Group 12th Bomb Group | 4 2 (TBF) 2 (<u>ex</u> . Desert) | A-20 B-25 B-25 | Soliman (SW) Hergla Hergla |
| 340th Bomb Group No. 232 Wing | 4 2 | B-25 Baltimore III-A | Hergla Enfidaville |
| No. 326 Wing 3 S.A. Wing 3 S.A. Wing | 2 1 2 | DB-7 Baltimore III A-20C | Grombalia Soliman (N) Soliman (N) |

(NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Fantelleria and Lampedusa," App. A.)

- 18. NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," par. 7.
- 19. Eisenhower Report; NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," Annex A.
- 20. The 33d Fighter Group, for example, was undoubtedly counted among these, for it began its part in the Pantellerian campaign on 21 May. ("33d Fighter Group [in the] Pantelleria Campaign," History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 4.)
- 21. Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, 14 May-12 June 1943."

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- 22. Eisenhower Report. During the second half of May, targets other than Pantelleria included Naples, Rome, Leghorn, and Foggia in Italy; Palermo, Messina, Marsala, Licata, and Trapani in Sicily: La Maddalena, Cagliari, and Sassari in Sardinia. In addition, airdromes in all three of these general areas were heavily bombed. In fact, from 15 to 21 May, the air attack appears to have been directed chiefly at the Sardinian airfields, where most of the enemy bombers operating against Allied ports and shipping were located. During the same period, the three Sicilian airfields of Sciacca, Castelvetrano, and Milo (Trapani) were heavily bombed. From 22 to 28 May, the main weight of the Allied air offensive fell upon such Sicilian airfields as Comiso, Castelvetrano, Biscari, and Sciacca, for aerial reconnaissance had shown that the largest bomber concentrations were now to be found there. The attacks curtailed the enemy's night-bomber effort against Allied ports in Algeria and Tunisia. During the last of May, when many of the German long-range bombers had been transferred from Sardinia and Sicily to bases in southern Italy, Allied air attacks were shifted to that area. Foggia airfield was one of the targets, because aerial photographs had shown a concentration of Ju-38's there. In the vicinity of Naples, Capodichino, Pomigliano, and other airdromes also were struck. (RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, p. 46.)
- 23. A total of 1,267 tons of bombs were reported to have been used on these targets during the two weeks of 15 to 30 May. Enemy losses for the period were said to have been 135 fighters and 33 bombers. Ours were given as 43 fighters and 9 bombers. ("Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," prepared by NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., in History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 3.)
- 24. See n. 22.
- 25. O.N.I. Weekly, II, No. 18, 5 May 1943, p. 1263.
- 26. [Maj. B.E. Clark] War Diary, Hq. XII Bomber Comd., 1 Jan.-1 Oct. 1943.
- 27. Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 87, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 18 May 1943; Hq. NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operations Bulletin, No. 3, 1-30 June 1943, "The Air Effort Against Pantelleria." pp. 18-19.
- 28. <u>Ibid</u>. For the 23d, see CM-IN-15655 (5-24-43), Spaatz to Arnold, 24 May 43; and CM-IN-15734 (5-25-43), Algiers to WAR, 24 May 43, For the 24th, see CM-IN-16636 (5-26-43), Algiers to WAR, 25 May 43; and CM-IN-16718 (5-26-43), Eisenhower to WAR, 26 May 43.
- 29. NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," par. 8. For references to ground fire encountered on missions, see CM-IN-16355 (5-26-43), Eisenhower to AGWAR, 25 May 43. See also (contd)

- 29. (Contd) "33d Fighter Group in the Pantelleria Campaign," History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 4. In the beginning of the Pantellerian campaign, pilots of the 33d Fighter Group found the trip of 100 or more miles to the island and back additionally hazardous because of the possibility of engine failure. Owing to previous heavy operations which had taken place in the sand and dust of southern Tunisia, they found that engine performance had fallen decidedly. (Ibid.)
- 30. On 20 May, photographic reports showed five LCT's and two Siebel ferries in the harbor, and five Ju-52's on the airdrome. (<u>Ibid</u>.)
- 31. Siebel ferries are lighters used for transporting troops or supplies. They can be identified readily because of their construction of twin steel pontoons joined by a high bridge amidships andby platforms level with the deck fore and aft. Their length varies from 75 to 80 feet, and their width from 45 to 50 feet. Their speed is 8 to 12 knots. They are usually equipped with multi-barreled and single-barreled AA guns. Owing to their division into compartments, they can absorb a good deal of battering by machine guns or even cannon. (RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 6, p. 57.)
- 32. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, pp. 41-42.
- 33. Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc.," Sec. VIII.
- 34. For details of attacks on the port and the airfield of Pantelleria during the second half of May, see incoming cables from Northwest African Headquarters for the period.
- 35. The landing point, originally given as Plata Ficarra, was corrected to read Punta della Ficarra or Punta Kharace. (See CM-IN-1002 (6-2-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #W1805/6845, 2 June 43; and CM-IN-2321 (6-4-43), Algiers to WAR, #W1944, 4 June 43.)
- 36. <u>Ibid.</u>; CM-IN-9656 (6-16-43), Algiers to WAR, #Z5963/1183, 15 June 43; and CM-IN-9965 (6-16-43), a corrected copy of this cable.
- 37. Sea-rescue work sometimes aided Intelligence too, for enemy airmen were occasionally included among those saved. They were then available for interrogation and might provide information of considerable value to the Allies. (NACAF, "Their Victory," p. 27.)
- 38. CM-IN-628 (6-1-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #W1772/6679, 1 June 43.
- 39. Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, Detailed Interpretation Report #D-44, dated 26 May 1943, in A-2 Lib. See also Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc."
- 40. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, pp. 41-42.

- 41. Eisenhower Report; Hq. XII Air Support Command, "Pantellerian Campaign, etc."
- 42. Ibid.; NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa."
- 43. Air Intelligence Weekly Summary, No. 33, 26 June-2 July 1943, pp. 27-28. During the intensive attack upon Pantelleria, the work done by men in the photographic laboratory received special commendation. (See Addends to Original Historical and Operational Record of NAPRW, 13 June 1943.) A description of some of the individual photographic missions run is also to be found here, under the dates of 13 June and 29 July 1943. Actually a large number of photographs were available, for some aircraft belonging to operational groups were equipped with cameras.
- 44. NATAF Operation Instruction No. 98, 30 May 1943.
- 45. NACAF, "Their Victory"; Hq. NACAF, A Six-Months' History of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force, March-30 Sep. 1943, p. 27.
- 46. NATAF Operation Instruction No. 98.
- 47. S. Zuckerman, Report on Plan and Execution of Operations at Pantelleria (first report, 2 June 1943; second report, 20 July 1943). In the absence of direct information concerning near misses and their effect on gun positions, it was thought that slight damage might result from a bomb dropped within 600 yards of a gun.
- 48. Eisenhower Report.
- 49. Ibid.; CM-IN-7452 (6-12-43), Spaatz to Arnold, thru Twelfth Air Force, Algeria to AGWAR, #JM 0561, 11 June 43. Professor Zuckerman was a professor of Biology at Oxford and one of the younger dons of Christ Church College. He later served on General Spaatz's staff in England. (See Sidney Shalett, "Nerveless Master of Our Superfortresses," in New York Times Magazine, 5 Aug. 1943.) For a list of the men who were associated with Professor Zuckerman in this phase of the operation, see n. 112, this chapter.
- 50. Zuckerman and Eisenhower Reports. For a circle of 600 square yards, the radius would be almost 14 yards. The following example will suggest the method used in calculating the bombing effort. If the dropping of approximately 400,000 pounds of bombs (400 x1,000-lb.) was considered necessary to give an even chance of knocking out a gun, and a B-17 could carry/1,000-lb. bombs on a mission, obviously some 66 sorties would be required to attain this end.
- 51. Ibid.

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52. Block-busters are giant bombs weighing 4,000 pounds each. They are made with a light metal casing, which permits 77.4 per cent of their total weight to be high - explosive material.

- For a day-by-day tabulation of the missions flown by the NAAF against Pantelleria and the weight of bombs dropped, see Hq. NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operational Bulletin No. 3, pp. 18-23. The fighter-bomber attacks against the three largest batteries are said to have begun on 30 May. (NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., "Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," par. 13. For daily operations, see also New York Times, O.N.I. Weekly, cables, communiquée, etc.)
- 54. According to some accounts, the B-17's began operations against Pantelleria on 31 May; others give the first operational date as 1 June. See the first two references above, for example.
- 55. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, pp. 41-42. In the course of the 20 days and nights represented, the distribution of effective sorties was reported as follows: 38 heavy, 607 medium, 53 light, and 967 fighter-bomber.
- 56. Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc.," Sec. V.
- 57. Ibid., Sec. VI. The following table, giving the number of sorties required of the XII Air Support Command by the NATAF directive, shows the distribution of its effort:

Sortie Summary

| Date | Fighter-Bomber | Escort | Umbrella | Total |
|---|---|--|--------------------------|---|
| D-12 (30 May) D-11 D-10 D-9 D-8 D-7 D-6 D-5 D-4 D-3 D-2 | 8 12 52 52 54 52 52 24 36 12 | 12 - - 12 - 144 240 120 | 192 | 20 12 52 52 56 52 52 168 276 324 |
| D-1 D-day TOTAL | 12 204 - 560 | 120 120 90 858 | 264 216 144 816 | 396 540 234 2,234 |

a. The nuisance raids made by No. 241 Sq. against selected targets are not included.

58. The steady increase in the scale of attack against Pantellerian installations is shown in the following table (compiled from material in Hq., NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operations Bulletin, No. 3, pp. 18-22):

Attacks of the Early Period

May

| Bombers | 8 | 11 | 18 | <u>20</u> | <u>21</u> | <u>22</u> | <u>23</u> | 24 | <u>25</u> | <u> 26</u> | 27 | 28 | <u> 29</u> |
|--------------------|----------|----|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|-----------|------------|----|----|------------|
| Fighter Medium | 13 | 10 | 31 76 | 5 - | 23 | 18 - | 16 72 | 18 | 51 - | 34 - | 19 | 16 | 44 43 |
| Night | - | - | | | | ~ | - | 22 | - | - | - | - | |
| Heavy | | - | - | ••• | ~ | - | · 🛶 | - | | ••• | - | ~ | - |
| Light | - | - | - | ~ | ~ | - | | - | *** | ~ | | | - |
| Total 511 Sorti | 13 es | 10 | 107 | -5 | 23 | 18 | 88 | 40 | 51 | 34 | 19 | 16 | 87 |

Intensive Attacks

| THICHSIVE WORDOWS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|-----|------|----------------|
| | Ma | У | | | | Jı | ine | | | | | | |
| Bombers | <u>30</u> | 31 | ī | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | <u>6</u> | 7 | 8 | 2 | 10 | 11 |
| Fighter | 52 | 55 | 86 | 97 | 104 | 104 | 97 | 107 | 85 | 104 | 162 | 354 | 84 |
| Medium | 37 | 38 | _ | 38 | 39 | 36 | 36 | 64 | 164 | 153 | 149 | 330 | 388 |
| Night | 22 | ~ | 16 | 16 | | 29 | 12 | 21 | 27 | 24 | 29 | 16 | 143 |
| Heavy ' | *** | | 19 | - | - | 19 | - | - | 60 | 102 | 111 | 258 | 110 |
| Light | | - | - | - | 5 | ~ | - | 48 | 81 | 119 | 190 | 136 | 198 |
| Total 4774 Sor | 111 ties | 93 | 121 | 151 | 148 | 188 | 145 | 240 | 417 | 502 | 641 | 1094 | 923 |

GRAND TOTAL 5285 sorties

- a. This figure is given in the Eisenhower Report as 5258. Escort, reconnaissance, etc. missions are, of course, not represented in this total.
- 59. See note 15, this chapter.
- 60. CM-IN-417 (6-1-43), Algiers to WAR, #6587/W1749, 1 June 43; CM-IN-561 (6-1-43), AFHQ Algiers to WAR, #6753/W1790, 1 June 43; and CM-IN-3352 (6-6-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #7738/W2013, 4 June 43 (LINREP 52). See also Eisenhower Report.
- 61. Addenda to Original Historical and Operational Record of NAPRW, 13 June 1943, under heading of 1 June.
- 62. <u>Ibid.</u>; CM-IN-1835 (6-3-43), Algiers to WAR, #W1887, 3 June 43; CM-IN-3352 (6-2-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #W2013/7738, 4 June 43.

- 63. RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, p. 69.
- 64. CM-IN-2485 (6-43), Algiers to WAR, #1954, 4 June 43 (SITREP 223); CM-IN-3748 (6-6-43), AFHQ North Africa to AGWAR, #8213/W2118, 6 June 43; CM-IN-6586 (6-11-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR (LINREP #53), 11 June 43.
- 65. <u>Ibid.</u>; CM-IN-4417 (6-7-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #W2178/8571, 7 June 43. It was a cruiser escorted by the <u>Paladin</u> and <u>Troubridge</u> which carried out the bombardment on 5 June 1943.
- 66. Bisenhower Report.
- 67. Ibid.; CM-IN-8458 (6-14-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, 11 June 43. See also the firsthand account of C.R. Cunningham, a newspaper correspondent, given in New York Times, 10 June 1943, and the entry in the Butcher Diary, pp. 325-29. During this attack which lasted an hour and 16 minutes, General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham followed the engagement from the flagship Aurora. After the bombardment had been under way for a cuarter of an hour, Captain Butcher says that a flag was run up on the signal tower of the island. Through the smoke and the haze, there was some difficulty in discerning its meaning. At first, observers thought that the flag might be white, and hence a sign of the enemy's willingness to surrender. However, from the lookout presently came the information that the flag was one indicating "Alarm." For an estimate of the results, see CM-IN-7452 (6-12-43), 12th Air Force, Algiers to AGWAR, #JMO 561, 11 June 43.
- 68. Eisenhower Report; "33d Fighter Group in the Pantelleria Campaign,"
 History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 4. For the text of the
 message sent to the military governor of Pantelleria, see the New
 York Times, 12 June 1943. The second note, issued two days later,
 is said to have been almost identical, although it seems to have
 contained some admonitions regarding the delivery in an undamaged
 condition, of supplies, equipment, stocks of fuel, shipping, and
 small craft. Both messages were transmitted for General Eisenhower
 by It. Gen. Carl Spaatz, as commander of the Northwest
 African ir Forces.
- 69. Eisenhower Report; London <u>Times</u>, 12 June 1943; and Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc."
- 70. The military governor is said to have sent a radio message to Rome saying that the situation was serious, but that the island could hold out, if conditions grew no worse. See the account of Alexander Clifford, in <u>British Ministry of Information</u>, No. 1, 15 June 1943.
- 71. Hq. NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operations Bulletin, No. 3, pp. 20-21.
- 72. Sometimes, however, TBF missions were flown until noon. For their distribution throughout the day, see NATAF Operation Instruction No. 98.

- 73. Hq. NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operations Bulletin, No. 3, pp. 20-22.
- 74. CM-IN-3793 (6-6-43), Algiers to WAR, #8245, 6 June 43; CM-IN-3928 (6-7-43), Eisenhower, through 12th Air Force, to WAR, #V 64E, 6 June 43; Air Intelligence Weekly Summary, No. 30, 5-11 June 1943. See also NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, pars. 13 and 14. In discussing the enemy opposition offered to Allied air units during the last week of the campaign, the XII Air Support Command gives the date of the first sizable encounter with Axis fighters as 6 June. ("Pantellerian Campaign, etc., Sec. VIII). At that time 5 Me-109's attacked Spitfires escorting A-20's, and 8 Me-109's and FW-190's attacked Spitfires accompanying Baltimores. On the previous day, the long-range enemy fighters apparently were met by SAF missions only.
- 75. The bombing and strafing of the airdrome at Korba North took place at 0600 hours on 7 June, with 20 FW-190's participating in the raid. Bombs were dropped from an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet, destroying two aircraft and damaging four others. The casualties included one enlisted man of the Air-Sea Rescue Detachment killed, and 20 enlisted men and three officers of the 31st Fighter Group wounded. (Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc.," Sec. VIII.) The attack on Sousse, on the night of 10/11 June, was less disastrous. No damage was sustained by shipping, as the bombs dropped clear of the harbor. (CM-IN-7919 (6-13-43), AFHQ, North Africa to AGWAR, #W 2562/334, 12 June 43.)
- 76. "Twelfth Air Force in the Sicilian Campaign," Pt. II, Pantelleria Operations, pars. 24-25. Here the number of enemy planes seen near Pantelleria during the June offensive is given as 250. The XII Air Support Command ("Pantellerian Campaign," Sec. VIII) reports the following list of Axis fighters sighted or engaged by its aircraft during this period:

| | Fighters | Date. | | | | |
|-------|----------|---------|--|--|--|--|
| | 13 | 6 June | | | | |
| | 52 | 7 June | | | | |
| | 28 | 8 June | | | | |
| | 45 | 9 June | | | | |
| | 113 | 10 June | | | | |
| | 104 | 11 June | | | | |
| TOTAL | 355 | | | | | |

77. Second missions were also flown by the heavy bomber groups on 10 June. The fact that some of the morning sorties had not met with success, owing to a 5/10 to 8/10 cloud coverage at 15,000 feet over the target, may have accounted for the flying of the second missions. ([Lt. Joseph M. McCoid] History of the 2d Bomb Group. (H), 24 Sep. 1942-31 Oct. 1943, p. 34.)

- 78. See the account of Merrill Mueller, a Newsweek correspondent who was over Pantelleria in a Flying Fortress on 10 June 1943, in Newsweek, IXI, No. 25, 21 June 1943, pp. 25-26.
- 79. CM-IN-7452 (6-12-43), 12th Air Force, Algiers to AGWAR, #JMO 561, 11 June 43.
- 80. B-17's, operating in force, acted as the spearhead of the attack. They were supported by Marauders, Mitchells, A-20 Bostons, Baltimores, Lightnings, P-40 Warhawks, and Spitfires.
- 81. It was later learned that, under the tremendous bombing attacks of 10 June, Pantelleria simply stopped functioning. That night Gen. Achille Maffei, the senior officer of the garrison, is said to have informed Mussolini by radio that the situation was unendurable. A repetition of the day's bombing would make continued defense of the island impossible, and even invasion could no longer be resisted, he felt. (Clifford account, in British Ministry of Information, No. 1, 15 June 1943.)
- 82. CM-IN-7459 (6-12-43), Eisenhower, thru Hq. 12 Air Force to WAR, ll June 1943; Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of ll June 1943; and NATAF "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria," par. ll. A cable of ll June 1943, CM-IN-7509 (6-12-43), Hq. 12th Air Force to WAR, says that 37 enemy planes were destroyed, with a loss to the Allies of one Marauder (B-26) and four Warhawks (P-40's).
- 83. For the composition of the assault brigade and its supporting group, see CM-IN-9611 (6-16-43), Algiers to WAR, 15 June 1943.
- 84. The intensive training of the past two weeks consisted of practice in embarking and disembarking from assault craft, fighting in the street, learning to keep one's head down as picked marksmen chipped plaster from a neighboring wall at levels only a foot or two above it, etc. (See the account of Keith Hooper, a British correspondent who was an eyewitness, in <u>British Ministry of Information</u>, No. 38, 12 June 1943.)
- 85. Account of E. A. Montague, in <u>British Ministry of Information</u>, No. 3, 13 June 1943. See also Hooper account, <u>ibid.</u>, no. 38, 12 June 1943.
- 86. Alfred Wagg, "Last Hours of an Empire," in Colliers Weekly, 24 July 1943 [herethafter cited as Wagg account].
- 87. Eisenhower Report; Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of June 1943. The protection against air and submarine attack which the Northwest African Coastal Air Force gave to shipping was a highly specialized task. Because of their long experience over the hazardous sea approaches to the British Isles, this work was entrusted principally to RAF squadrons. Some assistance, however, was given by USAAF fighter units. British Hurricanes, Spitfires, and Warhawks, equipped with (contd)

- 87. (Contd) auxiliary fuel tanks to give them greater range, and American Lightnings kept watch over Mediterranean shipping by day. At night Beaufighters assumed the task; even after ships had reached port, they patrolled the harbor area. In the Pantellerian operation, NACAF units were responsible for the protection of the convoys up to the landing area, and of the ships and craft of the assault force throughout D-day. (See NATAF Operation Instruction No. 105 (complementary to No. 98), par. 2.)
- 88. London Times, 14 June 1943.
- 89. For firsthand accounts, see that of Alexander Clifford in British Ministry of Information, No. 2, 13 June 1943, and a radio talk, "Capture of Pantelleria," by Comdr. Anthony Kummins, R. N., 22 June 1943. (A copy of this talk was included in material loaned by the British Library of Information.)
- 90. For the schedule of TAF missions up to 1000 hours on D-day, see NATAF Operation Instruction No. 98, App. B.
- 91. Clifford and Kummins accounts.
- 92. NATAF Operation Instruction Nos. 98 and 105. See also Hq. XII Air Support Comd., "Pantellerian Campaign, etc.," Sec. V. During the preliminary stages and up to 1000 hours on D-day, the control of all fighter aircraft of the XII Air Support Command had been handled by the Third Air Defense Wing (afterwards the 64th Fighter Wing). Its direction, along with that of the Tactical Bomber Force, now passed to the Air Officer in the combined headquarters.
- 93. For a preliminary report of the bombing effort of the Strategic Air Force for 11 June, see CM-IN-7963 (6-13-43), Spaatz to Arnold, thru 12th Air Force to WAR, JMO 599, 12 June 43. The targets included the airdrome, barracks, an ammunition dump, and gun positions. On observing the white cross on the airdrome, several aircraft withheld their bombs.
- 94. Clifford account; Wagg account, pp. 26, 66; Eisenhower Report.
- 95. Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of 12 June 1943, under NATAF summary.
- 96. In an interview of 8 April 1944, Lt. Howard Egbert, a pilot of the 340th Bombardment Group, said that, of 50 missions flown, the one connected with the capture of Pantelleria stood out very sharply. He commented especially on the scene presented on 11 June by the island being fired upon by ships and attacked from the air. (U.S. 9000, in A-2 Lib.)
- 97. Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of 12 June 1943, under NATAF summary. A message reporting the appearance of the white cross on the airdrome is said to have been received from Lt. Col. John D. Stevenson shortly after 1100 hours.

- 98. Eisenhower Report.
- 99. Clifford and Kummins accounts.
- 100. Ibid.
- 101. Wagg account. According to a cabled message, the white flag was hoisted on the semaphore tower at 1137 hours. (See CM-IN-9611 (6-16-43), Algiers to WAR, 15 June 43.)
- 102. Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of 12 June 1943.
- 103. Experiments in the use of G.C.I./C.O.L. sets installed in landing craft were made at this time. These LCT accompanied the assault convoys and controlled fighter planes for their own protection during the operation. When the actual landings had been made, they were then driven ashore and established in suitable places.
- 104. Hooper account.
- 105. CM-IN-15467 (6-12-43), Algiers #7452 to WAR, JMO #561, 11 June 43; Eisenhower Report; CM-IN-12187 (6-12-43), Algiers #7341 to WAR, 11 June 43. See also Butcher Diary, pp. 329-331.
- See Wagg account and Eisenhower Report. It was later learned that, 106. in response to the two Allied demands for surrender, Admiral Pavesi had decided to accept the second ultimatum. His intention to surrender on the night of 10 June had not been carried out, on account of failure to receive the necessary sanction from Rome until the next morning. Some further delay had ensued while his files and codes were being destroyed. As a consequence the prescribed tokens of surrender were displayed only a short time before the arrival of the assault force. The governor is said to have been so unaware of the impending invasion that he interpreted the approach of a large number of British ships as evidence of another bombardment. (Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 201, 10 July 1943) According to Mr. Clifford's account. the watch on Pantelleria had sighted the Allied convoys at 0950 hours. and presently was able to report that assault craft were included in the armada. Upon receipt of this news, Admiral Pavesi had informed Rome that a landing could not be opposed. He therefore was given permission to surrender. At 1100 hours, he sent to Malta a radio message signifying his willingness to captiulate. Owing to the clouds of smoke and dust which enveloped the island, the white cross displayed on the airfield was not noticed at once. (Clifford account.)
- 107. CM-IN-7371 (6-12-43), Algiers to WAR, #94, 11 June 43.
- 108. Eisenhower Report.

109. By 1900-B hours, on 11 June, the Rear Admiral of L Force had transferred his flag to the destroyer <u>Tartar</u>, and all other ships and landing craft had sailed for Sousse. Several hours earlier, however, a number of cruisers and destroyers had left for Lampedusa. (CM-IN-7850 (6-13-43), AFHQ North Africa to WAR, #W2587/490, 13 June 43.)

110. Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 113, for the

period at 1800 hours, 13 June 1943.

On a mission at 1220 hours, 18 Spitfires of the 31st Fighter Group were sent to Pantelleria as convoy cover. While patrolling waters north of the island, the planes sighted a formation of 36 FW-190's and Me-109's preparing to attack the convoy. Engaging the enemy aircraft, the Spitfires forced 12 of them to jettison their bombs to meet them. The remainder, however, struck at the convoy. In the course of the attack, 5 Me-109's were destroyed and one damaged. The Spitfires held the enemy bombers to one direct hit and one near miss on the convoy. As a result of the engagement, the 31st Fighter Group lost one plane; the pilot bailed out, and was later rescued.

About 1500 hours, another formation of Spitfires from the same group sighted 15 FW-190's with an escort of 15 Me-109's over Pantelleria. Attacking at 8,000 feet, they forced about half of the enemy bombers to jettison their bombs and meet them. The others, meanwhile, attacked the convoy. In the ensuing engagement, which ranged from sea level to 9,000 feet over a 30-mile area, the Spitfires reported five enemy aircraft destroyed and one damaged. ([Capt. Aaron Sladbodkin] History of the 31st Fighter Group, June 1943.)

- 111. Eisenhower Report; Clifford account. After the surrender of Pantelleria, Admiral Pavesi is said to have proved most helpful in explaining the internal arrangements of the island and in ordering the Italians to assist in the restoration of communications, etc.
- 112. The following men were associated with Professor Zuckerman in the assessment of ground effects and in the analysis of data:

Maj. A.P.D. Thompson Capt. J.V. Taylor, of R.E.M.E. Sec., attached to 63d L.A.A. Regt. Sq. Leader J. Angles F/Lt. B. Delisle Burns

Mr. F. Walley, of the Ministry of Home Security, London (assisted in the analysis of the sortic records)
Capt. R. Radford, R.E. (helped in the study of the strike photographs)

Interrogation of Italian officers who had been in command of the batteries was carried out by Capt. J.D. Berry (attached officer HQ. 1st British Div.) and 2d Lt. Ignatius De Cicco (A.C., N.A.A.F.) A brief report on the damage done to underground cables on the island was provided by 2d Lt. Gisto Canestari, Signal Corps, N.A.A.F.

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- 113. Although it was necessary to unload all ships and craft, except the floating reserve, 500 prisoners were reported captured on the first day. In the process of mopping up the number so increased that approximately 3,000 prisoners were landed at Sousse on the night of 12/13 June. By 1800 hours on 13 June, 4,283 prisoners had been evacuated. (CM-IN-9611 [6-16-43], Algiers to WAR, 15 June 43.)

 A few days after the occupation of the island, the size of the garrison was estimated at approximately 11,135. (CM-IN-8353 [6-14-43], AFHQ, North Africa to AGWAR, 13 June 43.)
- 114. For daily reports of enemy activity in the Pantellerian area, see the incoming cables for the period. Through the maintenance of patrols and continuous fighter cover over the island, the Allies usually were able to counter these raids. On 14 June, however, divebombing attacks on the harbor and its environs resulted in the sinking of the water ship Empire Maiden and one MGC, with some military casualties. (CM-IN-10303 [6-17-43], Algiers to WAR, #12871/1676, 16 June 43; and CM-IN-10712 [6-17-43], a corrected copy of this cable. See also the weekly summary given in CM-IN-13602 [6-22-43], Algiers to WAR, #W3216/3391, 21 June 43.)
- 115. In a cable of congratulation to the Allied air force in North Africa, upon completion of the Pantellerian operation, General Arnold stressed this point in another connection. He said: "The tremendous amount of bombs dropped and the negligible losses of planes speak well for planning, preparations, and execution." (CM-OUT-4833 [6-12-43], Arnold to Spaatz and Tedder, thru CG, U.S. Army Forces, Algiers, #120, 12 June 1943.) For a congratulatory message from Lord Trenchard, see AFAEP Off. Serv. Branch, WP III-F-5, Italy.
- 116. For the British units stationed on the island, see n. 118, this chapter.
- 117. Eisenhower Report. For General Strickland's assignment, see Hq. NAAF, SO 104, 6 June 1943. A detailed account of his duties is to be found in [Maj. Albert Simpson] Army Air Force Service Command on the Island of Pantelleria, 11 June 1943-1 December 1944, p. 18.
- 118. Establishment of the permanent garrison and the transfer of command was begun as early as 14 June, when the 1st British Infantry Division minus one battalion evacuated Pantelleria. Two days later, the main headquarters of the division was closed on the island at 1200-B hours and opened at Sousse at the same time. Actual command, however, did not pass to General Strickland until 1300-B hours on 17 June. The defense of the island was entrusted to Colonel Faulkner, a British officer whom General Strickland had designated as Garrison Commander. (CM-IN-13602 [6-22-43], Algiers to WARC #W3216/3391, 21 June 43. See also [Simpson] Army Air Force? Command on the Island of Pantelleria, etc., pp. 16, 22, 25.

\$70 in

- 119. "33d Fighter Group in the Pantelleria Campaign," in History of the Twelfth Air Force, III, Annex 4.
- 120. Eisenhower Report.

Chapter III

- 1. AFHQ Intelligence Collation, B 389.232 (No. 2)—Lampedusa, 16 May 1943, issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in A-2 Lib. [Hereafter cited as AFHQ Intelligence Collation.] See also Inter-Service Information Series, Report on Lampedusa (Text and Plans), February 1943 [C.B. 4096 W (142)]
- 2. In 1938, the town of Lampedusa, which was the only settlement of any size, had a population of about 2,000. At the time of its capture the number was reported as 3,500, a figure which normally included about 700 convicts. (New York Times, 9 June 1943). Lampedusa, like Pantelleria, lacked water, and, as a consequence, had scant natural plant cover. Yet the limestone soil was fertile, and, despite the handicap of aridity, about half the island was under cultivation. As a usual thing, the arable land lay along the valley floors, but lowland tracts at the southeastern end of the island were also used for farming. Grains, vegetables, grapes, and citrus fruits comprised the principal products. Strong Mediterranean winds often caused considerable damage to crops, although the stone walls which enclosed the fields afforded a moderate degree of protection. (AFHQ Intelligence Collation.)
- 3. The airfield, located in the southeast corner of the island, was irregular in shape. There were no runways, but a perimeter track encircled the field. Extensions from the north and west boundaries, however, allowed for runs of 1,000 yards from east to west and 400 yards from northwest to southeast. Although the surface was reported to be much worn, it was thought that the northern and western sides of the landing ground could be used. The harbor afforded some accommodation for seaplanes, but because of its mallness there was reason to suppose that planes of this kind landed in the outer bay and were towed into the safer waters of the harbor proper. (Ibid.)
- 4. New York Times, 9 June 1943.
- 5. Eisenhower Report. If Pantelleria were taken, it was likely that Lampedusa, Linosa, and Lampione would also capitulate, since they were virtually cut off from Italy. (Butcher Diary, p. 322)
- 6. CM-IN-9965 (6-16-43), Algiers to WAR #1183, 15 June 43, a corrected copy of CM-IN-9656 (6-16-43). See also AFHQ Intelligence Collation.
- 7. According to these accounts, a British scouting party had landed on Lampedusa on the night of Monday, 7 June, but had been repulsed by brisk machine-gun fire. This reconnaissance raid was interpreted as a minor-scale attempt to estimate the strength of the enemy's defenses. Since British operational headquarters frequently remained silent about Commando raids disclosed by the enemy, it was suggested that no mention of this attack had been made forreasons of security. (New York Times, 10, 11 June 1943.)



8. Eisenhower Report. Probably through a typographical error, the bomb load for this mission was given as seven and one-half tons. In a cable from General Spaatz to General Arnold, the number and kind of bomb carried on this raid were listed as follows:

24 B-26's dropped 50 x 300-1b. 24 x 500-1b. 8 x 1,000-1b.

TOTAL 35,000 lbs., or 17 1/2 tons

(See CM-IN-7963 [6-13-43], Twelfth Air Force to WAR, #JM 0599, 12 June 43.) One B-26 was reported missing at the close of this mission. (CM-IN-12947 [6-21-43], NAAF to WAR, #105, 13 June 43, a corrected copy of CM-IN-8135 [6-13-43]. See also CM-IN-9781 [6-16-43], 12th Air Force, Algiers to WAR, 12 June 43.)

- 9. Eisenhower Report.
- 10. The group of destroyers included the Laforey, Loyal, Lookout, Nubian, Troubridge, and the Greek destroyer Queen Olga. (O.N.I. Weekly, II, No. 24, 16 June 1943, p. 1700.) According to General Eisenhower's Report, the destroyer Jervis also took part in the Lampedusan operation, for it is reported as having engaged in one of the naval bombardments of 12 June.
- 11. Eisenhower Report.
- 12. Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 206, 14 August 1943, pp. 26-28. These pages contain an eyewitness's account of the fall of Lampedusa. Photographic reconnaissance had indicated the existence of 37 coastal defense or dual-purpose guns, 4 heavy AA guns, and about 50 light ones. (AFHQ Intelligence Collation.) For the general distribution of the defense positions, see the map of Lampedusa following page 48.
- 13. The enemy force on Lampedusa was thought to be composed of the following groups:

| Infantry | 1,500 |
|-----------|-------|
| Artillery | 1,000 |
| Engineers | 500 |
| Services | 300 |
| | |
| TOTAL | 3,300 |

(See AFHQ Intelligence Collation.)

- 14. According to Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 112, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 12 June 1943, the Lampedusan effort of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force for the day of 11 June consisted of the following missions:
 - a. 24 A-36/of the 27th Bomb Gp. attacked Lampedusa, dropping 42 x 500-lb. bombs on the target area.
 - b. 12 A-20's of the 47th Bomb Gp. attacked Lampedusa, dropping 24 x 300-1b. and 96 x 20-1b. bombs from 8,500 feet. These fell across gun emplacements. Three A-20's were damaged by flak.
 - C. Four missions totaling 48 sorties were flown by Bostons
 (12 by No. 114 Sq. and 12 by No. 18 Sq. of the 326 Wing (RAF);
 12 by the 47th Bomb Gp.; and 12 by the SAAF) against Lampedusa.
 23 x 300-lb.
 95 x 250-lb.
 208 x 40-lb.
 576 x 20-lb.
 On the whole, the targets were well covered. Two Bostons
 were damaged by flak.
 - d. 24 sorties were flown by B-25's (12 by the 340th Bomb Gp. and 12 by the 12th Bomb Gp.), on two missions against Lampedusa. From 8,500 feet, 18 x 1,000-lb. 36 x 500-lb. 996 x 250-lb. bombs were 1 x 100 lb. dropped. These fell in good patterns across the target areas.
- 15. CM-IN-7726 (6-13-43), Algiers to WAR, #JMO 614, 12 June 43; see n. 13, this chapter.
- 16. Nine Wellingtons of the 330 Wing (RAF) took off from between 2140-2326 hours. (Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 113, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 13 June 1943.) Some of the Wellingtons are said to have carried block-buster bombs. (Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of 12 June 1943.)
- 17. Eisenhower Report; Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 206; Wagg account.
- 18. A preliminary report of the air effort for 12 June lists the following totals for bombs dropped on Lampedusa during the day:

In six missions, 144 B-25/escorted by P-38's, dropped a total of 581 x 500-1b. and 36 x 1,000-1b. bombs, causing severe damage to harbor, warehouse, dock installations, and town.

(Contd)

18. (Contd) 24 Baltimores
(2 missions, apparently)
12 Bostons
12 B-25's
32 A-36's

dropped 96 x 300-lb. and 191 x 250-lb. demolition bombs, covering town, harbor, and landing ground, with good results.

See CM-IN-8539 (6-14-43), a corrected version of CM-IN-8421 (6-14-43), Spaatz to Arnold, through Algiers to WAR, #JMO 642, 13 June 43. According to cable CM-IN-8440 (6-14-43), Algiers to WAR, 13 June 43, 96 sorties, comprising four missions, were carried out by Mitchells of the NASAF on 12 June, prior to Lampedusa's surrender.

- 19. See CM-IN-7726 (6-13-43), Spaatz to Arnold, through Algiers to WAR, #JMO 614, 12 June 43; and Hq. NAAF, Operations and Intelligence Summaries. No. 112, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 12 June 1943. Some A-36's of the 27th Bombardment Group, over Lampedusa about 0935 hours, reported that small-arms fire had been directed at the A-20's which were leaving the target area as they arrived. (See 27th Bomb Gp., "Pantelleria and Lampedusa Campaigns, etc.") The loss of one A-36 in the course of the day (12 June) was attributed to failure of the dive brakes and not to enemy action. (Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 113, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 13 June 1943.)
- 20. Eisenhower Report. The total number of sorties for this period of slightly more than 24 hours is given in a preliminary report as approximately 600. (CM-IN-7726 (6-13-43), Spaatz to Arnold, thru Algiers to WAR, #JMO 614, 12 June 43.)
- 21. Public Relations Offices, RAF-USAAF, release of 12 June 1943.
- 22. Four A-36's of the 27th Bombardment Group dropped messages on the airfield and town. (Hq. NAAF, Operational and Intelligence Summaries, No. 112, for the period ending at 1800 hrs., 12 June 1943. See also 27th Bomb Gp., "Pantelleria and Lampedusa Campaigns, etc.")
- 23. See Form 34; and 27th Bomb Gp., "Pantelleria and Lampedusa Campaigns, etc.," Mission Requests and Intelligence Reports.
- 24. Ibid. Both A-36's and A-20's seem to have been over the target area as late as 1800 hours.
- 25. New York Times, 13 and 15 June 1943; Wagg account.
- 26. In the absence of the military governor, the negotiations were conducted by the second in command, an Italian naval captain in charge of the garrison. (CM-IN-7850 [6-13-43], AFHQ, North Africa to WAR, #W 2587/490, 13 June 43.) The conditions offered him were that (1) all hostilities must cease at once; (2) all war materiel was to (contd)

- 26. (Contd) be handed over undamaged; and (3) the entire garrison, including the Fascist militia, were to become prisoners of war. It is said that at first he showed some hesitation about signing the terms of surrender, on the ground that the white flag had not been raised on his order. Upon being reminded that the Allied forces had hundreds of airplanes at their beck and call, he delayed no longer. (O.N.I. Weekly, II, No. 34, 25 Aug. 1943, pp. 2545-2546.)
- 27. Soon after the capture of Lampedusa the number of prisoners was estimated as 4,000 or 5,000. (CM-IN-8786 [6-14-43], AFHQ, North Africa to WAR, 14 June 43.) Some days later, when a more careful count had been taken, the figures were given as 170 officers and 4,161 men of other ranks. (CM-IN-14577 [6-23-43], AFHQ, North Africa to WAR, #3267/3610, 22 June 43, a supplementary copy of CM-IN-13957 [6-22-43].)
- 28. O.N.I. Weekly, II, No. 34, 25 Aug. 1943, pp. 2545-2546.
- 29. For a description of the ceremonial parade and the formal surrender on the morning of 13 June, see <u>ibid</u>. See also <u>Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary</u>, No. 206, pp. 26-28.
- 30. CM-IN-13602 (6-22-43), Algiers to WAR, #W 3216/3391, 21 June 43.
- 31. About the time of the departure of these ships for Linosa, British vessels lying off Lampedusa are said to have been attacked by enemy aircraft attempting to break up the Allied force landing on the island. The Lookout, which had been dispatched with the infantry landing craft, seems to have borne the brunt of the attack, but suffered no damage. (New York Times, 13 June 1943; Wagg account; O.N.I. Weekly, No. II, No. 24, 16 June 1943, p. 1701.)
- 32. <u>Ibid.</u> See also Wagg account; <u>New York Times</u>, 14 June 1943; and incoming cables from AFHQ, North Africa to WAR, Nos. 8786 (6-14-43), 8975 (6-15-43), 9588 (6-16-43), and 12801 (6-21-43).

Chapter IV

- 1. New York Times, 9 June 1943.
- 2. In the summer of 1942, for example, the supplying of Malta was timed for mid-June, when the enemy was much engaged in the Western Desert campaign. In accordance with a carefully planned scheme, conveys were to be passed simultaneously from the east and the west, in the hope that at least one would reach its destination. Although every effort was made to provide adequate protection, only two of the four merchant ships from Gibraltar made harbor. None of the seven from the east arrived, because the menace of a strong Italian naval unit forced the convoy to return to Alexandria.

Before the launching of the Allied attack in the fall, a convoy movement to Malta was again attempted from the west. Of the 14 merchant vessels that passed Gibraltar on the night of 9-10 August, only five reached the island. Another effort was not made until three months later, when the ground situation then seemed to warrant the risk. On the evening of 16 November, four heavily escorted merchant ships · left Port Said. The westward sweep of the battle in North Africa enabled the convoy to make the trip in comparative safety. Ten other ships arrived in December. It was not long before possession of Cyrenaican landing grounds once more permitted the Allied air forces to give coverage to convoys from the east, and soon Malta itself was sufficiently reinforced to counter any threat from enemy aircraft based in Sicily and southern Italy. Since passage from this direction could be made almost without incident, supplies to Malta were sent by this route during the late winter and the spring of 1943. ("The Fight For the Mediterranean," RAF Middle East Review, No. 3, pp. 118, 121-122.)

- 3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 107.
- 4. An examination of gun positions after the surrender of Pantelleria indicates that the fire of the naval guns had been accurate. Yet, even in cases where there was evidence that bursts had occurred in emplacements or on the walls of emplacements, apparently little damage was caused. (Zuckerman Report, p. 7.) On the basis of American experience on Guadalcanal, it was thought at the time that naval bombardment might have a more nerve-racking effect than attack from the air. (Newsweek, XXI, No. 25, 21 June 1943, p. 24.) One of the lessons learned from the Pantellerian experiment was that of the efficacy of a combined bombardment; devastating bombing from the air coupled with the more flexible close-range naval-support fire is likely to keep heads under cover and guns silent until the landing craft are aground. (Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, C/S, to C-in-C, etc., Subject: Lessons from Operations against Pantelleria, dated 12 July 1943. U. S. 9600-9665, in A-2 Lib.)

- 5. Newsweek, XXI, No. 25, 21 June 1943, pp. 22-23; New York Times, 12 June 1943. For Maj. Gen. James A. Doolittle's comments as reported, see ibid.
- 6. According to prisoner-of-war accounts, it was not until 6 June that the Allied bombing of the island made much impression upon the garrison. ("The Last Days of Pantelleria," Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 202, 17 July 1943, pp. 30-31.)
- 7. CM-IN-10362 (6-17-43), Algiers to WAR, #W 2846/1595, 16 June 43; CM-IN-10446 (6-17-43), Algiers to WAR, #W2846/1595, 16 June 43; Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943.
- 8. Eisenhower Report. The 2d Zuckerman Report (p. 6) gives the number killed as 100 to 200.
- 9. Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 202. Prisoners of war proved a useful source of information concerning conditions on the island prior to its surrender. Two German officers, Leutnant Schmitt and Leutnant Lieser, furnished a good deal of the information used here. (See ibid.)
- 10. Clifford account.
- 11. See report/comments of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, in O.N.I. Weekly, II, No. 25, 23 June 1943, pp. 1782-1783.
- 12. 2d Zuckerman Report, App. XX, p. 2.
- 13. Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 202. After 6 June, the mental effects of the bombing became serious, owing largely to the nerve-racking continuity of the attacks, and to the impossibility of doing any work, of manning positions, or of obtaining a few hours of continuous sleep.
- 14. After the fall of Tunisia there were said to be about 600 German personnel stationed on Pantelleria. Most of these men were specialists, drawn largely from the Luftwaffe. It had been the responsibility of this group to train their Italian assistants so that they could take over the operation of the RDF and AA radio location sets. By the beginning of June—and until the fall of the island—this number had been reduced to 78—all of them GAF members, commanded by the two German officers mentioned in footnote 9, this chapter. (Ibid.)

In an early estimate of the number of prisoners taken on Pantelleria, the German element was said to consist of a platoon of 28 men and one officer. This group had been manning defenses on the airfield. On the morning of 11 June, when it became known that the surrender of the island had been decided upon, most of this group endeavored to escape in a rather dilapidated boat. After having got 10 miles out to sea, they found that the boat was leaking badly. Meanwhile Allied fighter

(contd)

- 14. (Contd) planes had caught sight of them, and soon Allied motor boats were sent to bring the party back. (<u>Ibid.</u>; and CM-IN-8740 [6-14-43], Algiers to WAR, #W 2685/900, 14 June 43.) In the reports of the prisoner-of-war accounts given by the two German officers, Leutnant Schmitt and Leutnant Lieser, the number of Luftwaffe members left on Pantelleria is given as 50. In a cable of 16 June, the German captives were said to be 78. (CM-IN-10446 [6-17-43], Algiers to WAR. #W 2846/1595, 16 June 43; and CM-IN-11119 [6-18-43].)
- 15. The total weight of bombs dropped during the period has been variously estimated. Apportionment among the various kinds of target was as follows:

Airdromes — 180 tons (of which 52 tons were 20-lb. fragmentation bombs)

Town and harbor — 743 tons (of which 31 tons were 20-lb. fragmentation bombs)

Gun emplacements (of which 135 tons were 20-lb. fragmentation bombs)

("Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," par. 21. This estimate of 6,313 tons is slightly larger than that given in the day-by-day tabulation included in appendix of this study.)

- 16. Dispatches by E. A. Montague, 15 June 1943; A. Clifford, 15 June 1943; K. Hooper, 14 June 1943; and Report by Brig. A. D. Campbell on a Visit to Pantelleria, 18-19 June 1943, 2d Zuckerman Report, App. XXV.
- 17. 2d Zuckerman Report, p. 5. The population of the town was reported to have been without water for three days. (CM-IN-7612 (6-12-43), Algiers to WAR, #W 2563/335, 12 June 43. See also Army Air Forces Evaluation Report, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, VII, Pt. A, "Operation CORKSCREW: The Capture of the Island of Pantelleria," dated 1 Dec. 1944.)
- 18. CM-IN-10237 (6-17-43), Spaatz to AGWAR, for CG, AAF, attention AFAIB, thru Algiers, #JMO 752, 16 June 43. The list of airplanes abandoned on the Pantellerian airfield included:

| 7 Me-109 | 6 C | R-25 |
|----------|-----|--------|
| 1 Ju-52 | 4 R | e-2001 |
| 14 G-50 | 7 S | M-79 |
| 9 Mc-200 | 4 S | M-81 |
| 9 Mc-202 | 9 S | M-82 |
| 2 Mc-205 | 2 0 | a-164 |
| 9 CR-42 | | |

TOTAL 83

18. (Contd) A second list, arranged according to types gives the number of planes as 84:

| It | alian | : | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------|-----|-----------|-----|----|----|-----|----|---|---|-----|-----|---|---|----|
| | Fight | ers | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Mac | chi | 20 | 5 - | | - | - | - | | - | - | ~ | - | - | 2 |
| | Mac | chi | 20 | 2 - | | - | - | _ | - | - | _ | - | - | _ | 10 |
| | Mac | chi | 20 | 0 - | - | _ | - | _ | - | - | _ | - | - | - | 7 |
| | Fia | t G | -50 | | - | _ | - | _ | - | - | - | - | - | _ | 14 |
| | Fia | t C | R-4 | 2 . | _ | _ | - | _ | | | _ | | - | _ | 9 |
| | Reg | gia | ne | 200 | 01 | | _ | _ | _ | - | - | - | - | _ | 4 |
| | Bombe | | | | | | gge | rt | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | -Ma | | | | | | | - | _ | _ | _ | _ | 7 |
| | Sav | oia | Ma | rc | he | tt | i | 8. | L | ~ | _ | - | - | - | 5 |
| | Sav | oia | .–Ma | rc | he | tt | i | 82 | 2 | _ | _ | | ~ | _ | 9 |
| | Misce | lla | nec | us | | | | | | | | | | | - |
| | | | i l | | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | | | _ | 2 |
| | | | R-2 | | | - | - | _ | - | | - | - | - | - | 6 |
| G | erman Fight | ers | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | : :sch | mi | tt | | LO | 9 | _ | _ | _ | _ | - | _ | 7 |
| | Trans | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | - 52 |) | _ | _ | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | - | 1 |
| | | | Ler | | to | r | ch | 11 | _ | - | - | _ | - | - | 1 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | TO' | TA. | L | Ü | 84 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |


The Re-2001 and the Mc-205 were among the latest Italian fighters. Both types of aircraft were equipped with 7.7-mm. wing guns—an indication that the Italians might have abandoned their concept of a two-gun fighter and were making the addition of wing guns a standard modification

The SM-79 represented torpedo bombers, a type of plane that one would expect to find included in the group.


The Fiat CR-25's belonged to an obsolete, multi-purpose type of plane used chiefly for light bombing and reconnaissance. In this case, the planes appeared to have been employed for the transport of personnel.

One of the Me-109's (a G-6 of very recent date) had full Italian marking and camouflage, although all cockpit labels were in German—an occurrence by no means usual.

- 19. Clifford account.
- 20. 2d Zuckerman Report, App. XIII; and AAF Evaluation Board Report, MTO, VII, Pt. A. In building the so-called underground hangar, a section of one of the hills on the island had been cut away, leaving a plot some 1,000 feet long (north-south) and 250 feet deep (east-west), backed by a vertical wall about 50 feet high. This ground was then leveled and used as the floor for the hangar, which was designed to face east and front on the landing field. Steel girders formed the (contd)



In diagram, the hangar presented this appearance:



Because of the method of construction, the roof of the hangar required no pillar supports or bracing—an arrangement that admitted maximum floor space. The building was provided with its own electrical generating plant, ventilation system, and water supply. Beneath the roof, at both ends of the hangar, extended galleries which furnished accommodation for offices, storage compartments, etc. On the floor level, similar use had been made of the space between the back concrete and dirt walls of the structure. At the north end of the building were located workshops equipped with lathes, trip hammers, drills, and machines for handling metal. The central section of the hangar was supplied with electrical cranes and carriers, hoists, supports, and other types of equipment essential to the maintenance and repair of aircraft.

During the attacks on the island many members of the garrison and a number of civilians lived in the main hangar, for there were hundreds of mattresses and beds found there. For safety, motor buses and other transport also had been moved inside. ([Simpson.] Army Air Force Service Command on the Island of Pantelleria, etc., pp. 7-9; Air Intelligence Weekly Summary, No. 31, 12-18 June 1943, pp. 16-17.)

4. 4

- 22. A detailed assessment of the damage to the guns was made by the R.E.M.E. Section, under the command of Capt. J. V. Taylor, R.E.M.E., attached to the 63d L.A.A. Regiment. (2d Zuckerman Report, p. 3 and App. VII ff.) Since most of the guns were protected by low emplacement walls only, it was thought that this report also would be a fair indication of the effect of aerial bombing on field artillery. ("Air Attacks on Pantelleria Gun Positions," O.N.I. Weekly, III, No. 12, 22 March 1944.)
- 23. Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943; 2d Zuckerman Report, p. 8.
- 24. Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943.
- 25. 2d Zuckerman Report, p. 6.
- Signals between the senior naval officer landing, the beachmaster, and the headquarters ship failed to work during the initial stages of the landing. As a consequence, the operation was delayed at a time when speed should have been paramount. Fortunately it was daylight, and the landing was virtually unopposed. In darkness, and against a resolute defense, such signal failures might have proved very serious indeed. The air plan did not call for the cessation of prearranged air bombardment, and so it was not discontinued until after the island had surrendered and the first troops were ashore. In the Pantellerian operation the consequences were not serious. This rigidity of the air plan and the inadequacy of the air-groundship communications might have jeopardized the flexibility of the ground commander's plans and limited his freedom to make the most of success. Since the very high-frequency radiotelephone to aircraft was satisfactory, better control could have been arranged if the requirement had been stated in the planning stage. In the interest of speed and efficiency, it was recommended that plain language should be used more frequently in circumstances such as the Pantellerian opera tion, in which the enemy was in no position to profit by messages sent in the clear. (For these, and other recommendations, see Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943.)
- 27. In this operation there were several instances in which troops advanced beyond the bombing line before the time appointed. This circumstance was charged to a shortage of watches among the company and platoon officers. In the future, it was stipulated that all commanders must be provided with watches, in order to avoid situations of potential danger. (Ibid.)
- 28. It developed that air personnel on board the headquarters ship Largs (controllers, signal officer, and filter officer) were unacquainted with the air order of battle, types of aircraft participating, radio recognition signals, R/T in use, and call signs of ground stations. This lack of information points to briefing inadequate for an operation of this sort. (Lbid.)

- 29. The need for coordinating available intelligence among air, naval, and ground forces was clearly shown. It is essential that the three services reach a command agreement on the types and layout of maps, overprints, etc. (Ibid.)
- 30. Ibid.
- 31. NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," pars. 17, 21.
- 32. NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., "Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943."
- 33. Ibid.; memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943.
- 34. 2d Zuckerman Report, p. 7.
- 35. Memo, Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith to C-in-C, 12 July 1943.
- 36. NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., "Pantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," par. 30; NATAF, "Participation in the Capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa," pars. 22, 23.
- 37. For the comments of the British correspondent in Ankara, see the London Times article dated Ankara, 13 June 1943.
- 38. Comments of newspaper correspondents, etc.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Materials used in the preparation of this study have been drawn from a variety of sources as indicated in the footnote citations. These records, for the most part, consist of official documents, although newspaper and magazine articles and a few current books have been consulted.

The initial phases of the CORKSCREW operation are best described in General Eisenhower's dispatch on the Fantellerian offersive and in the preliminary sections of his report on the Sicilian campaign. Good accounts of the implementation of the plan and of the responsibilities assumed by fighter and bomber elements are to be found in the operational narratives of various components of the Northwest African Air Forces. Cables, radiograms, unit histories, and intelligence summaries furnish details of dayby-day action, while appraisals like those of the AAF Evaluation Board and the group of scientific experts headed by Professor Zuckerman give estimates of the value of the operation.

The part played by the Royal Navy in the establishment of the blockade and in the shelling of the island is set forth in Admiral Cunningham's message to the Admiralty (CinCMED, "The Occupation of Fantelleria and the Subsequent Capture of Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa," 30 Nov. 1943). Although this document, with its numerous inclosures, was not seen until after the completion of the study, a careful check shows that the account of naval action included by General Eisenhower in his dispatch on the Pantellerian offensive differs from the official report in a few minor details only. (In one or two instances these differences have been noted.)

Columns of the New York Times and a folder of newspaper clippings loaned by the British Library of Information in New York have proved extremely useful in supplying firsthand reports of the CORKSCREW operation, as seen by correspondents in the field. Their impressions of the intensity of the attack is borne out by Combat Film Report No. 402 entitled "Fantelleria", a movie made from aerial photographs taken in the course of the operation.

For the capture of Lampedusa, the materials are somewhat meager but nevertheless adequate, as the action itself was limited in scope and of short duration. Unit histories and cables give details of the missions flown and the longer reports on the Fantellerian offensive include sections on the taking of Lampedusa and the neighboring islands of Linosa and Lampione.

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Appendix

THE AIR EFFORT AGAINST PANTELLERIA

Following is a day-by-day tabulation of the missions flown by the Northwest African Air Forces against the island of Pantelleria from 8 May 1943 until the surrender of the garrison on 11 June 1943, together with a tabulation of our losses from flak and enemy aircraft.

1. DAILY ANALYSIS

| Date | Aircraft | Bombs Number & Weight | Dropped Total Weight |
|--------|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| DECE | Number & Type | MORDAL & MATKIC | TOOTT HATCH |
| 8 Мау | 13 P-38 | 13 x 1000 | 13,000 |
| 11 May | 10 P-40 | 10 x 500 | 5,000 |
| 18 May | 34 B-26 | 608 x 100 | 60,800 |
| | 10 P-40 | 60 x 20 | 1,200 |
| | 42 B-25 | 246 x 500 | 123,000 |
| | 21 P-38 | 19 x 500 | 9,500 |
| 20 May | 5 P-38 | 5 x 1000 | 5,000 |
| 21 May | 14 P-40 | 84 x 20 | 1,680 |
| | 9 P-38 | 8 x 500 | 4,000 |
| | • • • | 1 x 1000 | 1,000 |
| 22 May | 18 P-40 | 36 x 20 | 720 |
| • | | 10 x 500 | 5,000 |
| 23 May | 16 P-40 | 96 x 20 | 1,920 |
| | 34 B-26 | 708 x 100 | 70,800 |
| | 38 B-25 | 265 x 300 | 79,500 |
| | | 12 x 100 | 1,200 |
| 24 May | 22 Wellington | s 3 x 4000 | 12,000 |
| | | 2 x 1000 | 2,000 |
| | | 64 x 500 | 32,000 |
| | | 142 x 250 | 35,500 |
| | | 1620 x 4 | 6,480 |
| | 18 P-40 | 8 x 500 | 4,000 |
| | · | 60 x 20 | 1,200 |

SOURCE: NAAF, A-3 Sec., Operations Bulletin No. 3, June 1943, pp. 18-23. (In a few cases typographical corrections have been made.)

| Dete | Aircraft | Bombs | Dropped |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Date | Number & Type | Number & Weight | Total Weight |
| 25 May | 51 P-40 | 20 x 500 | 10,000 |
| | | 162 x 20 | 3,240 |
| 26 Kay | 34 P-40 | 105 x 20 | 2,100 |
| | | 12 x 500 | 6,000 |
| 27 May | 12 P-40 | 8 x 1000 | 8,000 |
| - | | 3 x 500 | 1,500 |
| | 7 P-38 | 7 x 500 | 3,500 |
| 28 May | 16 P-40 | 8 x 1000 | 8,000 |
| | • | 8 x 500 | 4,000 |
| 29 May | 20 P-40 | 20 x 500 | 70,000 |
| • | 24 P-38 | 22 x 1000 | 10,000 22,000 |
| | 24 B-25 | 66 x 1000 | 66,000 |
| | 19 B-26 | 70 x 1000 | 70,000 |
| 30 May | 22 Wellingtons | 2 x 4000 | 9 000 |
| - | | 124 x 500 | 8,000 62,000 |
| | | 60 x 250 | |
| • | 45 P-38 | 42 x 1000 | 15,000 42,000 |
| | 7 P-40 | 7 x 500 | 3,500 |
| | 20 B-25 | 59 x 1000 | 59,000 |
| | 17 B-26 | 51 x 1000 | 51,000 |
| 31 May | 33 P - 38 | 33 x 1000 | 33,000 |
| | 22 P-40 | 12 x 500 | 6,000 |
| | | 10 x 1000 | |
| | 20 B-26 | 79 x 1000 | 10,000 79,000 |
| | 18 B-25 | 53 x 1000 | 53,000 |
| 1 June | 16 Wellingtons | 2 x 4000 | 8,000 |
| | _ | 14 x 1000 | |
| | | 133 x 500 | 14,000 66,500 |
| | | 54 x 250 | 13,500 |
| | 51 P-38 | 50 x 1000 | 50,000 |
| | 19 B-17 | 114 x 1000 | 114,000 |
| | 35 P-40 | 35 x 500 | 17,500 |
| 2 June | 16 Wellingtons | 22 x 1000 | 22,000 |
| | _ | 99 x 500 | 49,500 |
| | | 48 x 250 | 12,000 |
| | 52 P-40 | 52 x 500 | 26,000 |
| | 45 P-38 | 45 x 1000 | 45,000 |
| | 38 B-26 | 111 x 1000 | 111,000 |
| | | | |

| | Aircraft | | Dropped |
|----------------|---|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Date | Number & Type | Number & Weight | Total Weight |
| 3 June | 21 B-26 | 83 x 1000 | 83,000 |
|) (11.0 | 61 P-38 | 60 x 1000 | 60,000 |
| | 18 B-25 | 54 x 1000 | 54,000 |
| | 43 P-40 | 43×500 | 21,500 |
| | 5 Boston | 22 x 500 | 11,000 |
| 4 June | 29 Wellingtons | | 116,000 |
| | 18 B-25 | 52 x 1000 | 52,000 |
| | 54 P-38 | 53 x 1000 | 53,000 |
| | 18 B-26 | 45 x 1000 | 45,000 |
| | 19 B-17 | 114 x 1000 | 114,000 |
| | 50 P-40 | 50 x 500 | 25,000 |
| 5 June | 12 Wellingtons | 2 x 4000 | 8,000 |
| | | 6 x 1000 | 6,000 |
| | | 78 x 500 | 39,000 7,500 |
| | A/ B 05 | 30 x 250 | 7,500 |
| | 36 B-25 | 104 x 1000 40 x 1000 | 104,000 40,000 |
| | 42 P-38 | 55 x 500 | 27 , 500 |
| | 55 P-40 | 55 x 500 | 21,500 |
| 6 June | 21 Wellingtons | | 80,000 |
| | 17 P-40 | 12×500 | 6,000 |
| | | 5 x 1000 | 5,000 |
| | 90 P -3 8 | 90 x 1000 | 90,000 |
| | 40 B-26 | 136 x 1000 | 136,000 |
| | 12 Boston | 52 x 500 | 26,000 |
| | 24 B-25 | 72 x 1000 | 72,000 |
| | 24 Baltimores | 60 x 500 | 30,000 |
| · | 12 A-20 | 36 x 500 | 18,000 |
| 7 June | 27 Wellingtons | 5 x 4000 | 20,000 |
| | | 6 x 1000 | 6,000 |
| | | 186 x 500 | 93,000 |
| | • | 66 x 250 | 16,500 9,000 |
| | 9 Hurricanes | 18 x 500 | 359 , 500 |
| | 60 B-17 | 719 x 500 | 117,000 |
| | 78 B-26 | 117 x 1000 224 x 500 | 112,000 |
| • | 13 75 20 | 41 x 1000 | 41,000 |
| | 41 P-38 | 252 x 1000 | 252,000 |
| | 86 B-25 19 P-40 | 19 x 1000 | 19,000 |
| | 24 Boston | 70 x 500 | 35,000 |
| | 24 Boscon | 21 x 250 | 5,250 |
| | 22 Baltimores | 88 x 500 | 44,000 |
| | te naromoroa | 12 x 250 | 3,000 |
| • | 35 A-20 | 100 x 500 | 50,000 |
| |)) A NO | 1 x 300 | 300 |
| | 16 A-36 | 21 x 500 | 10,500 |

| | Aircraft | Bombs | Dropped |
|---------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|
| Date | Number & Type | Number & Weight | Total Weight |
| 8 June | 24 Wellingtons | | 100,000 |
| | 93 P-38 | 93 x 1000 | 93,000 |
| | 102 B-17 | 598 x 1000 | 598,000 |
| , | 52 B-26 | 100 x 1000 | 100,000 |
| | • | 53 x 500 | 26,500 |
| | 101 B-25 | 263 x 1000 | 263,000 |
| | | 33 x 500 | 16,500 |
| | 11 A-36 | 11 x 500 | 5,500 |
| | 35 Baltimores | 125 x 500 | 62,500 |
| | | 39 x 250 | 9,750 |
| | 60 Bostons | 144 x 500 | 72,000 |
| | | 67 x 250 | 16,750 |
| | 24 A-20 | 70 x 500 | 35,000 |
| 9 June | 29 Wellingtons | 3 x 4000 | 12,000 |
| A amie | 27 Netting cons | 10 x 1000 | 10,000 |
| | | 160 x 500 | 80,000 |
| | | | 15,750 |
| | 50 P 26 | 63 x 250 | |
| | 50 B-26 | 299 x 500 | 149,500 |
| | 111 B-17 | 666 x 1000 | 666,000 |
| | 99 B-25 | 280 x 1000 | 280,000 |
| | 12 P-40 | 12 x 500 | 6,000 |
| | 58 Bostons | 107 x 500 | 53,500 |
| | | 84 x 250 | 21,000 |
| | 72 A- 20 | 178 x 500 | 89,000 |
| | | 2 x 300 | 600 |
| | 18 Hurribomber | | 9,000 |
| | 48 A-36 | 84 x 500 | 42,000 |
| | 84 P-38 | 84 x 1000 | 84,000 |
| | 60 Baltimores | 240 x 500 | 120,000 |
| | | 24 x 250 | 6,000 |
| 10 June | 58 A- 20 | 165 x 500 | 82,500 |
| | 42 Baltimores | 150 x 500 | 75,000 |
| | | 18 x 250 | 4,500 |
| | 175 B-25 | 519 x 1000 | 519,000 |
| | | 1 x 100 | 100 |
| | 36 Bostons | 118 x 500 | 59,000 |
| | | 24 x 250 | 6,000 |
| | 124 P-40 | 81 x 1000 | 81,000 |
| | | 56 x 500 | 28,000 |
| | 39 A- 36 | 69 x 500 | 34,500 |
| | 16 Wellingtons | 1 x 4000 | 4,000 |
| | | 12 x 1000 | 12,000 |
| | | 111 x 500 | 55,500 |
| | | 18 x 250 | 4,500 |
| | 258 B-17 | 3112 x 500 | 1,556,000 |
| | | | |

| Date | Aircraft | Bombs | Dropped |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|
| DECE | Number & Type | Number & Weight | Total Weight |
| 10 June (Contd) | 191 P-38 | 191 x 1000 | . 101 000 |
| | | 24 x 250 | 191,000 |
| | 155 B-26 | 169 x 1000 | 6,000 |
| | | 508 x 500 | 169,000 |
| • | | 700 x 700 | 254,000 |
| ll June | 66 Baltimores | 184 x 500 | 92,000 |
| | | 156 x 250 | 39,000 |
| | 60 A-20 | 142 x 500 | 71,000 |
| | | 24 x 300 | 7,200 |
| | | 96 x 20 | 1,920 |
| | 136 B-25 | 153 x 1000 | 153,000 |
| | | 96 x 250 | 24,000 |
| | | 5456 x 20 | 109,120 |
| • | 72 Bostons | 71×500 | 35,500 |
| | | 23 x 300 | 6,900 |
| | | 119 x 250 | 29,750 |
| | | 208 x 40 | 8,320 |
| | 9 Hurribombers | 18 x 500 | 9,000 |
| | 24 A-36 | 45 x 500 | 22,500 |
| | 27 P-38 | 24 x 1000 | 24,000 |
| | | 3 x 500 | 1,500 |
| - | 143 Wellingtons | • | 607,750 |
| | 252 B-26 | 276 x 500 | 138,000 |
| | _ | 157 x 300 | 47,100 |
| | 24 P-40 | 24 x 500 | 12,000 |
| | 110 B-17 | 270 x 1000 | 270,000 |
| | | 641 x 500 | 322,500 |

2. SUMMARY

The effective effort expended against Fantelleria by various types of aircraft from 8 May 1943 until the surrender on 11 June 1943 was as follows:

| | Effective | | lombs Dropped | |
|---------------------|---|----------------|---------------|------------|
| Type of A/C | Bombing Sort | ies Pounds | Tons | % of Total |
| B-17 | 679 | 4,000,000 | 2,000 | 32.2 |
| B-25 | 835 | 2,280,420 | 1,140.2 | 18.4 |
| B-26 | 828 | 1,819,700 | 909.8 | 14.7 |
| A-20 | 261 | 355,520 | 177.8 | 2.9 |
| A-36 | 138 | 115,000 | 57.5 | •9 |
| P-38 | 936 | 911,500 | 455.8 | 7.4 |
| P-40 | 679 | 372,640 | 186.3 | 3.0 |
| Wellington | 377 | 1,650,980 | 825.5 | 13.3 |
| Boston | 267 | 385,970 | 193.0 | 3.1 |
| Baltimore | 249 | 485,750 | 242.9 | 3.9 |
| Hurricane | 36 | 27,000 | 13.5 | •2 |
| TOTALS | 5,285 | 12,404,480 | 6,202.2* | 100 % |
| Туре | 3. NAAF LOSSE Destroyed | S OVER PANTELL | | |
| B-17 | 200010,00 | Da | maged 4 | Wissing |
| B-25 B-26 | | | 3 | 1 |
| A-36 P-38 | 1 | | | 2 |
| P-40 | ı | | 3 | 2 |
| Wellington | 2 | | | 3 |
| Boston Baltimore | | | 2 4 | 1 |
| | *************************************** | , | - | |
| TOTALS | 4 | • | 16 | 10 |

^{*}Total tonnage is given as 6,313 in NAAF Operations Analysis Sec., "Fantelleria, 30 May through 11 June 1943," par. 21.

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